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I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, commentators have noted the propensity of the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit to refuse to defer
to administrative agency decisions 2 and, more specifically, to remand
© Copyright held by the NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW.
* Skadden Fellow, 2006-08. Law Clerk, 2005-06, The Honorable Diane P. Wood,
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. J.D., New York Univer-
sity School of Law, 2005. I would like to thank Professor Samuel Estreicher for
his advice and encouragement throughout the preparation of this article. I also
thank Craig Becker, James Coppess, Sarah Fox, Laurence Gold, and Lynn
Rhinehart for their comments. The views presented here are, however, solely my
own.
1. Erie-Lackawanna R.R. Co. v. United States, 279 F. Supp. 316, 355-56 (S.D.N.Y.
1967) (Friendly, J.), affd as modified, Penn-Central Merger & N & W Inclusion
Cases, 389 U.S. 486 (1968).
2. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Two Problems in Administrative Law: Political Polar-
ity on the District of Columbia Circuit and Judicial Deterrence of Agency
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such orders back to the agency, 3 with several commentators specifi-
cally considering the D.C. Circuit's treatment of orders issued by the
National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB" or "Board").4 Much of this
scholarly literature has focused on such questions as whether judges
on the court are voting according to their policy preferences, 5 whether
a remand without vacatur is an allowable and desirable mechanism
for judicial review of agency action under the Administrative Proce-
dure Act ("APA"),6 and the relevance of specific characteristics of
Rulemaking, 1988 DuKE L.J. 300, 301 ("The present D.C. Circuit is less deferen-
tial to the political branches of government than its predecessors. It affirms
agency actions far less frequently than did its predecessors."); Peter H. Schuck &
E. Donald Elliott, To The Chevron Station: An Empirical Study of Federal Ad-
ministrative Law, 1990 DuKE L.J. 984, 1031, 1042 (finding a "relatively low af-
firmance rate for administrative law cases in the D.C. Circuit").
3. See Ronald M. Levin, "Vacation" at Sea: Judicial Remedies and Equitable Discre-
tion in Administrative Law, 53 DuKE L.J. 291, 295 (2003) ("Over the past decade,
judicial resort to the device [of 'remand without vacation'] has become a familiar
feature of administrative law practice, especially in the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit."); Daniel B. Rodriguez, Of Gift Horses and Great Expectations: Remands
without Vacatur in Administrative Law, 36 ARIz. ST. L.J. 599, 612-17 (2004) (dis-
cussing "[tlhe D.C. Circuit's development of the remand without vacatur tech-
nique"); Patricia M. Wald, et al., The Contribution of the D.C. Circuit to
Administrative Law, 40 ADMIN. L. REV. 507, 528 (1988) (noting "the frequency
with which [the D.C. Circuit] . . . tell[s] an agency that it has not sufficiently
explained why it chose the course it did-in short, 'go back and rewrite your
reasons"').
4. See Joan Flynn, The Costs and Benefits of "Hiding the Ball": NLRB Policymaking
and the Failure of Judicial Review, 75 B.U.L. REV. 387, 420 n.138 (1995) (noting
that the D.C. Circuit is "the exception to the rule" among courts of appeals as "full
and partial remands [of the NLRB] by the D.C. Circuit exceeded set-asides by a
two-to-one margin"); Peter J. Leff, Failing to Give the Board its Due: The Lack of
Deference Afforded by the Appellate Courts in Gissel Bargaining Order Cases, 18
LAB. LAW. 93, 97-100 (2002) (discussing "the lack of deference being afforded to
the NLRB [by the D.C. Circuit] in bargaining order determinations" and the
court's propensity to remand such orders even when supported by substantial
evidence).
5. See James J. Brudney et al., Judicial Hostility Toward Labor Unions? Applying
the Social Background Model to a Celebrated Concern, 60 OHIo ST. L.J. 1675,
1761 (1999) [hereinafter Brudney, Judicial Hostility] (suggesting, based on a na-
tion-wide study, that "social background factors play a meaningful role in influ-
encing judicial approaches to labor law issues"); Richard L. Revesz,
Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit, 83 VA. L. REV. 1717,
1719 (1997) (concluding that "ideology significantly influences judicial decision-
making on the D.C. Circuit"). Cf. Harry T. Edwards, Collegiality and Decision
Making on the D.C. Circuit, 84 VA. L. REV. 1335, 1335, 1337 (1998) (rejecting
Revesz's charge that the D.C. Circuit is "influenced more by personal ideology
than legal principles" and suggesting instead that "judicial decision making is a
principled enterprise that is greatly facilitated by collegiality among judges").
6. See Kristina Daugirdas, Evaluating Remand Without Vacatur: A New Judicial
Remedy for Defective Agency Rulemaking, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 278 (2005) (conclud-
ing that "while there are situations when [remand without vacatur] is justified,
the [D.C. Circuit]'s application of the remedy is flawed"); Levin, supra note 3, at
292 (concluding that the APA permits courts to remand without vacation and
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NLRB policymaking to judicial treatment of the agency.7 None of this
literature has considered, in any detailed fashion, the principle of ad-
ministrative law that the D.C. Circuit has frequently relied upon in
refusing to enforce and remanding many NLRB orders-the Chenery
remand doctrine-and whether the court has properly applied this
doctrine in its case law. This Article attempts to fill this gap.
The D.C. Circuit, which is an alternate venue for appeals under the
National Labor Relations Act of 1935 ("NLRA" or "Act"),8 routinely
hears more petitions for review of NLRB orders than any other cir-
cuit.9 As a result of its special jurisdiction, the court is a key arbiter of
national labor policy, and its decisions have the practical effect of
binding the NLRB nationwide.lO In recent years, the relationship be-
tween the court and the NLRB has become especially fractious. Mem-
bers of the court have accused the Board of "rogue," "contumacious,"
and "recalcitrant behavior"1 ' and have described Board decisions as
"inscrutable" and "the antithesis of reasoned decisionmaking."
12
NLRB members, for their part, have expressed concern with "the dis-
dain and contempt for board decisionmaking" shown by the court as
well as the suspicion that "in some cases the appeals court simply dis-
agree[s] with the board's view of the facts and the appropriate reme-
dies under the circumstances-areas where the board is supposed to
defending the practice "as a legitimate exercise of discretion"); Rodriguez, supra
note 3, at 636-37 (urging "careful attention" to courts' use of such remands so as
to prevent "judicial activism").
7. Flynn, supra note 4, at 393, 418-21(suggesting that the NLRB's "subterranean
mode of policymaking," especially the "disparity between the Board's articulated
adjudicative standard and its application of that standard" has led to "judicial
hostility" towards the agency's decisions).
8. National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (current version at 29 U.S.C.
§§151-69 (2000)).
9. In 2003, for example, the D.C. Circuit decided 41 petitions for review-more than
one of every three of such petitions nationwide. 68 NLRB ANN. REP. 194 tbl. 19A
(2003). In contrast, the court of appeals that decided the next largest number of
such petitions, the Sixth Circuit, heard only 19 such petitions. Id.
10. Professors Estreicher and Revesz note that the NLRB does not acquiesce in ad-
verse circuit court precedent. Samuel Estreicher & Richard L. Revesz, Nonacqui-
escence by Federal Administrative Agencies, 98 YALE L.J. 679, 706-10 (1989).
However, as a practical matter, the Board "does not ordinarily initiate enforce-
ment proceedings in an adverse circuit unless it is prepared to distinguish the
prior case on its facts or to ask the circuit for reconsideration of the earlier deci-
sion." Id. at 708. Moreover, "[i]f the respondent seeks review in an adverse cir-
cuit, the Board does not ordinarily seek to reargue the matter but acknowledges
the controlling authority of the prior circuit decision and submits to the entry of
judgment against it." Id.
11. Exxel/Atmos, Inc. v. NLRB, 147 F.3d 972, 978 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (Sentelle, J.,
concurring).
12. Macmillan Publ'g Co. v. NLRB, 194 F.3d 165, 168 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (Randolph, J.).
2008]
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be entitled to deference." 13 A particular point of tension has been the
D.C. Circuit's pattern of refusing to enforce and remanding NLRB or-
ders on the grounds that the Board has failed to provide an adequate
explanation of its reasoning. The court has routinely justified these
remands by reference to the "Chenery doctrine."
The Chenery doctrine, derived from two eponymous Supreme Court
decisions from the 1940s, stands for the uncontroversial propositions
that "the orderly functioning of the process of [judicial] review re-
quires that the grounds upon which [an] administrative agency act[s]
be clearly disclosed and adequately sustained" 14 and that if an agency
does not clearly state those grounds, the court should remand for fur-
ther consideration rather than enter "the domain which Congress has
set aside exclusively for agency administration."15 In its SEC v. Che-
nery opinions, the Supreme Court stressed that it was not "imposing
trammels on [agency] powers," "enforcing formal requirements," or
"suggesting that [an agency] must justify its exercise of administra-
tive discretion in any particular manner or with artistic refine-
ment."16 Rather, as Judge Henry Friendly explained in an influential
article on the doctrine, Chenery only requires a remand "when the re-
viewing court concludes there is a significant chance that but for the
error the agency might have reached a different result."17 More con-
temporary Supreme Court decisions have ratified and elaborated upon
this pragmatic reading of the Chenery cases, explaining that a review-
ing court should "uphold a decision of less than ideal clarity if the
agency's path may reasonably be discerned."' 8
The D.C. Circuit nevertheless has frequently invoked the Chenery
doctrine as a basis for refusing to enforce NLRB orders even when the
Board's decisional path can easily be ascertained and a remand is un-
likely to lead the agency to reach a different result. Notably, the D.C.
Circuit has remanded routine NLRB orders pertaining to the conduct
of union representation elections, an area traditionally considered to
lie close to the heart of the Board's administrative expertise. 19 In
other instances, the court has refused to enforce NLRB orders based
13. Susan J. McGolrick, NLRB: Four Current Members Discuss Their Views On Ma-
jor Rulings, Criticism, Future Issues, 154 Daily Labor Report (BNA) C-1 (Aug. 10,
2001) (quoting Board Member Wilma B. Liebman).
14. SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery 1), 318 U.S. 80, 94 (1943).
15. SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery I), 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947).
16. Chenery 1, 318 U.S. at 95.
17. Henry J. Friendly, Chenery Revisited: Reflections on Reversal and Remand of Ad-
ministrative Orders, 1969 DUKE L.R. 199, 211.
18. Motor Vehicles Mfg. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43
(1983) (quoting Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., 419 U.S.
281, 286 (1974)).
19. See MacMillan Publ'g Co. v. NLRB, 194 F.3d 165 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (discussed infra
Part V.A.); Sundor Brands, Inc. v. NLRB, 168 F.3d 515 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (dis-
cussed infra Part IV.A.).
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on a strict requirement that the Board adequately distinguish its own
precedents, a requirement the court links to the Chenery doctrine.
20
Finally, the D.C. Circuit has rejected the NLRB's chosen remedies for
unfair labor practices in a number of cases, 2 1 requiring the Board to
meet heightened explanatory requirements if it wishes to have its or-
ders enforced.
The Chenery doctrine cannot bear the substantial weight the D.C.
Circuit has placed on it. In the SEC v. Chenery decisions, the Su-
preme Court displayed as much concern with curbing judicial interfer-
ence with administrative policymaking as it did with the rigorous
policing of the adequacy of agency reasoning. Later decisions con-
strued Chenery as having a "limited office," 2 2 such that "when a mis-
take of the administrative body is one that clearly had no bearing on
the procedure used or the substance of decision reached," a remand is
not necessary. 23 Moreover, modern administrative law decisions,
which counsel judicial deference to agency policy choices, cannot be
squared with the D.C. Circuit's aggressive use of Chenery; it is diffi-
cult to reconcile the court's numerous remands for further agency ex-
planation with the deference owed to an agency's "permissible
construction" of a "statute [that] is silent or ambiguous with respect to
the specific issue" as required by Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Re-
sources Defense Council, Inc. ,24 and an agency's "methods of inquiry,"
as required by Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Re-
sources Defense Council, Inc.25 It is telling in this regard that while
the D.C. Circuit continues to routinely utilize Chenery to remand
NLRB orders, the Supreme Court has not relied on the doctrine to
remand an agency decision based on inadequate reasoning in at least
two decades.
Not only is the D.C. Circuit's application of Chenery contrary to
Supreme Court precedent, it also imposes real costs in terms of the
NLRB's ability effectively to exercise its congressionally delegated au-
thority to develop labor policy and enforce the NLRA. This interfer-
ence is not limited to the obvious cases in which the court uses
Chenery remands as a means of preventing the Board from pursuing
its chosen policies. Repeated remands in routine cases may have the
effect, intended or otherwise, of coercing the Board to reverse its deci-
sion simply to appease the court. Even where the NLRB does not
20. See Randell Warehouse of Ariz., Inc. v. NLRB, 252 F.3d 445 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (dis-
cussed infra Part IV.B.); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. NLRB, 59 F.3d 230 (D.C.
Cir. 1995) (discussed infra Part IV.B.); cases cited infra note 142.
21. See Sullivan Indus. v. NLRB, 957 F.2d 890 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (discussed infra Part
IV.C.); cases cited infra notes 204-06.
22. Penn-Central Merger & N & W Inclusion Cases, 389 U.S. 486, 518 n.10 (1968).
23. Mass. Trs. of E. Gas & Fuel Assoc. v. United States, 377 U.S. 235, 248 (1964).
24. 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984).
25. 435 U.S. 519, 543 (1978).
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change course, routine remands force the agency to utilize scarce re-
sources to reissue its decisions, a practice that exacerbates the Board's
existing problems with timely adjudication.26 The D.C. Circuit's re-
mands of NLRB orders for failure to adequately distinguish prior
agency precedent raise both of these concerns. The overly strict en-
forcement of such a requirement improperly inhibits the Board from
changing policies that lie within its delegated discretion. Further,
such a requirement is especially burdensome for an agency that has
accumulated seven decades of fact-specific decisions.
The D.C. Circuit should alter its approach to Chenery by undertak-
ing a harmless-error analysis before remanding any NLRB decision on
the basis of inadequate reasoning. The D.C. Circuit previously fol-
lowed this approach itself.27 Several other circuits have adopted this
approach, 28 and it is in accordance with Supreme Court precedent.
2 9
An NLRB decision should be upheld if adequate reasoning "can be dis-
cerned with a modicum of judicial benevolence, even though the rib-
bons have not been neatly tied,"30 if a "narrowing interpretation"
would be sufficient to sustain the decision,31 or if there "is only one
plausible explanation of the issues" that the agency addressed.32 If
adopted, such a change in approach would contribute to a more coop-
26. See generally Samuel Estreicher & Matthew T. Bodie, Review Essay-Adminis-
trative Delay at the NLRB: Some Modest Proposals, 23 J. LABOR RES. 87 (2002)
(discussing the state of the NLRB and suggesting improvements to its
administration).
27. See, e.g., Braniff Airways, Inc. v. CAB, 379 F.2d 453, 466 (D.C. Cir. 1967) ("The
Supreme Court's opinions reflect the concern that agencies not be reversed for
error that is not prejudicial .... The principle ofSEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S.
194, 196 (1947), does not mechanically compel reversal 'when a mistake of the
administrative body is one that clearly had no bearing on the procedure used or
the substance of the decision reached."'(quoting Mass. Trs. of E. Gas and Fuel
Assoc. v. United States, 377 U.S. 235, 248 (1964))).
28. See Hackett v. Barnhart, 475 F.3d 1166, 1175 (10th Cir. 2007) (endorsing harm-
less error review in certain limited circumstances); Ngarurih v. Ashcroft, 371
F.3d 182, 190 n.8 (4th Cir. 2004) (endorsing harmless-error doctrine and citing
cases); In re Watts, 354 F.3d 1362, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ("[Tlhis [Chenery] princi-
ple does not obviate the need to consider the issue of harmless error or mechani-
cally compel reversal 'when a mistake of the administrative body is one that
clearly had no bearing on the procedure used or the substance of the decision
reached."' (quoting Mass. Trs. of E. Gas and Fuel Assoc. v. United States, 377
U.S. 235, 248 (1964))); Sahara Coal Co. v. Office of Workers' Comp. Programs,
946 F.2d 554, 558 (7th Cir. 1991) ("The harmless-error doctrine is available in
judicial review of administrative action; it is an exception to the Chenery princi-
ple. If the outcome of a remand is foreordained, we need not order one." (citations
omitted)).
29. NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759 (1969) (discussed infra Part III);
Mass. Trs. of E. Gas & Fuel Assoc. v. United States, 377 U.S. 235 (1964).
30. Friendly, supra note 17, at 218.
31. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 342 v. NLRB, 598 F.2d 216, 224 (D.C. Cir. 1979)
(Bazelon, J., dissenting).
32. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Boston & Maine Corp., 503 U.S. 407, 420 (1992).
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erative relationship between the D.C. Circuit and the NLRB-a rela-
tionship in which the court and agency act as partners rather than
competitors "in the task of safeguarding the public interest."
33
This Article examines the D.C. Circuit's use of the Chenery doc-
trine in the review of NLRB orders and suggests that the court rou-
tinely misuses the doctrine to refuse to enforce and remand decisions
in which the Board's policy choices are not unclear and where the re-
mand is unlikely to lead the agency to reach a different result. Section
II provides an overview of the relationship between the D.C. Circuit
and the NLRB, including a review of NLRB statistics from 1984
through 2003 that demonstrate that the court refused to enforce and
remanded far more Board orders than its sister circuits. Section III
reviews Supreme Court jurisprudence pertaining to the Chenery doc-
trine-from the two SEC v. Chenery decisions themselves to more re-
cent opinions interpreting the cases. Section IV provides a detailed
look at the D.C. Circuit's use of the Chenery doctrine through a discus-
sion of a number of cases in which the court has remanded NLRB or-
ders. Finally, Section V evaluates the D.C. Circuit's use of Chenery,
concluding that the court's approach is badly out of step with the Su-
preme Court's own views on the scope of the doctrine and creates sig-
nificant costs for the NLRB's administrative process that should be a
matter of concern for all parties who depend on the effective enforce-
ment of our nation's labor laws.
II. THE D.C. CIRCUIT'S ROLE IN REVIEWING NLRB ORDERS
The D.C. Circuit, owing to its role as the sole or alternate venue for
the review of the decisions of many administrative agencies, is widely
acknowledged to be the nation's "de facto . . . administrative law
court."34 The court has, over the years, developed a number of doc-
trines intended to more tightly regulate administrative decision mak-
ing 35-several of which have been struck down by the Supreme Court
33. Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4, 15 (1942) (Frankfurter, J.).
34. Wald, supra note 3, at 509 (noting that, in 1986, 48% of the court's filings came
from agencies and another 25% were appeals from cases involving government
parties).
35. See, e.g., Int'l Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 651 (D.C. Cir. 1973)
(Bazelon, J., concurring) (elaborating the proceduralist view that "the court's
proper role is to see to it that the agency provides a 'framework for principled
decision-making"' (quoting Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584,
598 (1971))); Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841 (D.C. Cir.
1970) (Leventhal, J.) (setting forth the "hard look" doctrine-that a reviewing
court should "intervene not merely in case of procedural inadequacies, or bypas-
sing of the mandate in the legislative charter, but more broadly if the court be-
comes aware... that the agency has not really taken a 'hard look' at the salient
problems").
20081 601
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as too restrictive of agency policymaking authority. 36 Nevertheless, in
recent years the D.C. Circuit has been even "less deferential to the
political branches of government than its predecessors."3 7 This lack of
deference is especially evident in the court's relationship with the
NLRB.
The D.C. Circuit's special role in reviewing NLRB orders derives
from the venue provisions of the NLRA. Under § 10(f) of the Act, a
party aggrieved by an order issued by the Board may petition the
court of appeals for review of such a decision "in the circuit wherein
the unfair labor practice in question was alleged to have been engaged
in or wherein such person resides or transacts business, or in the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia."38 Parties
charged with unfair labor practices, who are made up overwhelmingly
of employers rather than unions,3 9 therefore can forum-shop,
"seek[ing] out a circuit with venue over the action that has rejected
the agency's position."40 As one prominent employer-side labor attor-
ney advises potential clients:
An important early decision in the appeal process is the selection of the proper
court of appeals in which to file .... [T]he [NLRA] always permits an em-
ployer to challenge NLRB orders in the District of Columbia Circuit .... The
choice of forum can be crucial to the outcome of the appeal.
4 1
NLRB orders, like all administrative decisions, are supposed to be
treated with deference by reviewing courts. In a number of post-Chev-
ron decisions, the Supreme Court has "emphasized often that the
NLRB has the primary responsibility for developing and applying na-
tional labor policy," stating that it "accord[s] Board rules considerable
deference" and "will uphold a Board rule as long as it is rational and
36. See, e.g., Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837
(1984) (holding that D.C. Circuit improperly failed to defer to the Environmental
Protection Agency's reasonable construction of an ambiguous statutory term);
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S.
519 (1978) (rejecting Judge Bazelon's proceduralist approach to judicial review of
agency decisions). But see Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assoc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983) (affirming D.C. Circuit's application of the "hard look"
doctrine to review of a National Highway Safety Board regulation).
37. Pierce, supra note 2, at 301.
38. 29 U.S.C. § 160(f) (2000) (emphasis added). In contrast, "the Board's general
practice is to petition only in the circuit where the [unfair labor practice] oc-
curred." Estreicher & Revesz, supra note 10, at 706.
39. Typically, at least 90% of Board orders appealed to the circuit courts involve un-
fair labor practices against employers. See, e.g., 68 NLRB ANN. REP. 194 (2003).
For example, there were 125 NLRB petitions for enforcement or review decided
by federal courts in 2003. Of these, 116 involved Board orders against employers,
7 against unions, and 2 against both employers and unions. Id.
40. Estreicher & Revesz, supra note 10, at 710.
41. Maurice Baskin, Taking the Board to Court: Winning Appeals Against the NLRB,
VENABLE LLP (Labor and Employment Practice Group of Venable, LLP, Wash-
ington D.C.), June 2003, at 1, available at http://www.venable.com/docs/pubs/
1021.pdf.
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consistent with the [National Labor Relations] Act"42-a standard of
review that is "virtually indistinguishable" from that set forth by the
Supreme Court in Chevron.43 Although the NLRB has formal
rulemaking power,4 4 it virtually always sets policy through case-by-
case adjudication 4 5-a practice the Supreme Court has several times
upheld.46 The Court has also endorsed the Board's ability to change
its policies "in light of changing industrial practices and the Board's
cumulative experience in dealing with labor management relations,"
even when this means overruling longstanding agency precedent,
since "the Board has the 'special function of applying the general pro-
visions of the Act to the complexities of industrial life."'
47
The D.C. Circuit has, nevertheless, refused to extend much defer-
ence to the NLRB in recent years, placing it out of step with the gen-
eral trend towards judicial deference to agency action since Chevron.
In their empirical study of appellate court disposition of all adminis-
trative agency cases nationwide in the immediate wake of Chevron,
42. NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc., 494 U.S. 775, 786-87 (1990); see also
Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 482 U.S. 27 (1987) (upholding a
Board decision that a successor to a predecessor employer had a duty to bargain
with the union representing the predecessor's employees). Even in Allentown
Mack Sales & Service, Inc. v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359 (1998), in which the Supreme
Court denied enforcement of a Board order as not based on substantial evidence,
the Court concluded that the NLRB's policy choice-to use a "reasonable doubt"
test for employer polls-was "facially rational and consistent with the Act." Id. at
380.
43. Flynn, supra note 4, at 438.
44. 28 U.S.C. § 156 (2000) ("The Board shall have authority from time to time to
make, amend, and rescind, in the manner prescribed by [the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act], such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the pro-
visions of this [Act].").
45. The most notable exception to this practice was the NLRB's promulgation in the
late 1980s of a rule governing bargaining unit determinations in health care facil-
ities. Collective-Bargaining Units in the Health Care Industry, 54 Fed. Reg.
16,336 (Apr. 21, 1989) (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 103.30 (2006)); see generally Mark
H. Grunewald, The NLRB's First Rulemaking: An Exercise in Pragmatism, 41
DuKE L.J. 274 (1991) (documenting the Board's health care rulemaking
experience).
46. Allentown Mack, 522 U.S. at 374 (noting that the NLRB "has chosen to promul-
gate virtually all the legal rules in its field through adjudication rather than
rulemaking"); NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 294 (1974) ("ITihe
Board is not precluded from announcing new principles in an adjudicative pro-
ceeding and ... the choice between rulemaking and adjudication lies in the first
instance within the Board's discretion."); NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S.
759, 771 (1969) (Black, J., concurring) ("If [an] agency decision reached under the
adjudicatory power becomes a precedent, it guides future conduct in much the
same way as though it were a new rule promulgated under the rule-making
power .... No language in the National Labor Relations Act requires that the
grant or the exercise of one power was intended to exclude the Board's use of the
other.").
47. NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 266 (1975) (quoting NLRB v. Erie
Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 236 (1963)).
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Professors Schuck and Elliott found that affirmances increased from
70.9% to 81.3% between 1984 and 1985.48 Statistics published by the
NLRB similarly demonstrate that the percentage of Board orders af-
firmed by appellate courts nationwide increased from 67.6% to 83.6%
between these two years.4 9 In contrast, the percentage of NLRB or-
ders affirmed by the D.C. Circuit decreased from 66.7% to 55.6% be-
tween 1984 and 1985.50 This trend has continued; in the two decades
following Chevron, the D.C. Circuit's rate of affirmances remained be-
low the national average in 19 of 20 years. 5 1 Over this entire period,
the D.C. Circuit affirmed only 58.4% of all NLRB orders it considered,
compared to a rate of 71.6% affirmed by all appellate courts
nationwide.5
2
Table A: Percentage Of NLRB Orders Affirmed In Full By
The D.C. Circuit And All Courts Of Appeal
Nationwide, 1984-200353
AFFIRM - AFFIRM - AFFIRM - AFFIRM -
YEAR ALL CIR. D.C. CIR. YEAR ALL CIR. D.C. CIR.
2003 75.0 61.0 1993 78.2 47.6
2002 61.9 56.7 1992 73.3 65.2
2001 62.7 52.9 1991 76.4 80.0
2000 73.7 63.3 1990 78.9 68.4
1999 69.7 69.6 1989 77.8 62.4
1998 65.3 52.0 1988 75.3 70.0
1997 70.0 56.3 1987 79.4 47.0
1996 66.0 60.6 1986 74.1 41.2
1995 60.8 44.8 1985 83.6 55.6
1994 62.7 46.7 1984 67.6 66.7
AVERAGE: 71.6 58.4
48. Schuck & Elliott, supra note 2, at 1031.
49. 50 NLRB ANN. REP. 198 tbl. 19A (1985); 49 NLRB ANN. REP. 230 tbl. 19A (1984).
It is likely that the majority of these cases were disposed of in unpublished "ta-
ble" decisions. See Flynn, supra note 4, at 418 n.129 ("By the mid-1980s, courts
were disposing of 60% of administrative appeals in unpublished, or 'table' deci-
sions .... It stands to reason that a high percentage of NLRB appeals result in
table decisions").
50. 50 NLRB ANN. REP. 198 tbl. 19A (1985); 49 NLRB ANN. REP. 230 tbl. 19A (1984).
51. See infra Table A.
52. Id.
53. The data in Tables A, B and C was derived from data included in Table 19A,
"Proceedings Decided by Circuit Courts of Appeals on Petitions for Enforcement
and/or Review of Board Orders," that appears in each NLRB ANNUAL REPORT for
the years 1984 through 2003. 68 NLRB ANN. REP. 184 tbl. 19A (2003); 67 NLRB
ANN. REP. 141 tbl. 19A (2002); 66 NLRB ANN. REP. 187 tbl. 19A (2001); 65 NLRB.
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During the twenty-year period after Chevron, the number of NLRB
orders appealed to the D.C. Circuit grew as a percentage of such ap-
peals nationwide. 54 This trend accelerated sharply in the early 1990s,
presumably reflecting an increase in the number of employer appeals
to a forum that has proved especially willing to reverse or remand
NLRB orders.5 5 Throughout the 1980s, less than ten percent of peti-
tions for review nationwide were filed in the D.C. Circuit. 5 6 By 2003,
however, over one-third of all appeals of Board orders nationwide were
filed in the D.C. Circuit. 57 The D.C. Circuit's role as the key judicial
arbiter of national labor policy is further underlined by the fact that
the Supreme Court has granted review to very few labor cases in re-
cent years. 58 Between 1998 and 2003, for example, the Court decided
only four cases involving the NLRB as a party. 59
ANN. REP. 187 tbl. 19A (2000); 64 NLRB ANN. REP. 158 tbl. 19A (1999); 63 NLRB
ANN. REP. 182 tbl. 19A (1998); 62 NLRB ANN. REP. 159 tbl. 19A (1997); 61 NLRB
ANN. REP. 155 tbl. 19A (1996); 60 NLRB ANN. REP. 175 tbl. 19A (1995); 59 NLRB
ANN. REP. 146 tbl. 19A (1994); 58 NLRB ANN. REP. 165 tbl. 19A (1993); 57 NLRB
ANN. REP. 175 tbl. 19A (1992); 56 NLRB ANN. REP. 211 tbl. 19A (1991); 55 NLRB
ANN. REP. 192 tbl. 19A (1990); 54 NLRB ANN. REP. 244 tbl. 19A (1989); 53 NLRB
ANN. REP. 244 tbl. 19A (1988); 52 NLRB ANN. REP. 246 tbl. 19A (1987); 51 NLRB
ANN. REP. 268 tbl. 19A (1986); 50 NLRB ANN. REP. 198 tbl. 19A (1985); 49 NLRB
ANN. REP. 230 tbl. 19A (1984).
54. See infra Table B.
55. The NLRB does not break out the number of petitions filed by employers in each
judicial circuit in its Annual Report. However, the Board does publish the total
number of proceedings decided by the courts of appeal filed against employers
and against unions. During the period from 1990-2003, the percentage filed
against employers has remained steady at 90% or greater. See, e.g., 68 NLRB
ANN. REP. 194 (2003) (93% filed against employers); 62 NLRB ANN. REP. 154
(1996) (90% filed against employers); 56 NLRB ANN. REP. 191 (1990) (90% filed
against employers). It is therefore likely that the overall increase in the number
of appeals to the D.C. Circuit in recent years can be attributed primarily to ap-
peals filed by employers.
56. See infra Table B.
57. 68 NLRB ANN. REP. 194 (2003).
58. See generally James J. Brudney, A Famous Victory: Collective Bargaining Protec-
tions and the Statutory Aging Process, 74 N. CAR. L. REV. 939, 1035 (1996) [here-
inafter Brudney, Famous Victory] ("[Blecause the Supreme Court need not
review appellate court rulings and often does not do so even when a 'certworthy'
issue arises, [appellate court rulings may well become the final word on statu-
tory meaning.").
59. 68 NLRB ANN. REP. 183 tbl. 19 (2003) (indicating no cases decided by Supreme
Court); 67 NLRB ANN. REP. 140 tbl. 19 (2002) (indicating two cases decided by
Supreme Court); 66 NLRB ANN. REP. 186 tbl. 19 (2001) (indicating one case de-
cided by Supreme Court); 65 NLRB Ann. Rep. 186 tbl. 19 (2000) (indicating no
cases decided by Supreme Court); 64 NLRB ANN. REP. 157 tbl. 19 (1999) (indicat-
ing no cases decided by Supreme Court); 63 NLRB ANN. REP. 181 tbl. 19 (1998)
(indicating one case decided by Supreme Court).
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Table B: Percentage Of NLRB Orders Nationwide Reviewed
By The D.C. Circuit, 1984-20036o
% OF ALL APPEALS % OF ALL APPEALS
REVIEWED BY D.C. REVIEWED BY D.C.
YEAR CIRCUIT YEAR CIRCUIT
2003 34.2 1993 11.7
2002 28.6 1992 14.3
2001 28.8 1991 11.2
2000 31.3 1990 11.8
1999 17.4 1989 8.9
1998 17.4 1988 6.0
1997 19.3 1987 8.5
1996 22.4 1986 8.6
1995 24.2 1985 4.8
1994 10.6 1984 6.9
An important aspect of the D.C. Circuit's lack of deference to the
NLRB is its propensity to remand Board orders. In their survey of
appellate review of all agency decisions nationwide, Professors Schuck
and Elliot found that the frequency of remands in the year after Chev-
ron was decided decreased by over 40 percent.6 1 NLRB statistics re-
veal that appellate court remands of NLRB orders nationwide
decreased by roughly the same percentage between 1984 and 1985
and remained relatively steady in the 20 year period that followed.62
In contrast, the percentage of NLRB orders remanded by the D.C. Cir-
cuit increased dramatically between 1984 and 1985 and remained
steadily higher than the national average over the next two decades.
63
Thus, between 1984 and 2003, the D.C. Circuit remanded more than
one of every five NLRB orders it reviewed, a rate more than twice the
national average.6 4
60. See supra note 53.
61. Schuck & Elliott, supra note 2, at 1030.
62. See infra Table C.
63. Id.
64. Id.
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Table C: Percentage Of NLRB Orders Remanded By The D.C.
Circuit And All Other Courts Of Appeal
Nationwide, 1984-200365
% REMAND % REMAND
REMAND ALL REMAND ALL
YEAR D.C. CIR. OTHER YEAR D.C. CIR. OTHER
2003 19.5 13.3 1993 33.3 8.4
2002 13.3 8.6 1992 26.0 8.0
2001 29.4 18.6 1991 10.0 9.0
2000 23.3 12.2 1990 15.8 9.3
1999 13.0 5.3 1989 25.0 7.8
1998 24.0 11.2 1988 0.0 5.4
1997 15.6 9.0 1987 41.2 10.5
1996 12.1 8.9 1986 41.1 11.7
1995 24.1 10.8 1985 44.4 7.4
1994 20.0 11.9 1984 11.2 12.0
AVERAGE: 22.1 10.0
The D.C. Circuit has relied on the Chenery doctrine as the basis for
many of these remands. A review of the D.C. Circuit's published deci-
sions reveals that the court cited one of the Chenery decisions, one of
the court's own precedents interpreting the Chenery cases, or used
language closely tracking the Chenery doctrine to remand NLRB or-
ders in at least twenty-one instances between 1984 and 2003.66 In
65. See supra note 53. Orders remanded include both those categorized by the NLRB
as "[remanded in full" and those categorized as "[a]ffirmed in part and remanded
in part."
66. In the following cases, the D.C. Circuit cited Chenery in support of its decision to
remand an NLRB order: United Food & Commercial Workers International
Union, Local 400 v. NLRB, 222 F.3d 1030, 1034 (D.C. Cir. 2000); MacMillan Pub-
lishing Co. v. NLRB, 194 F.3d 165, 167 (D.C. Cir. 1999); Sundor Brands, Inc. v.
NLRB, 168 F.3d 515, 519 (D.C. Cir. 1999); Speedrack Products Group, Ltd. v.
NLRB, 114 F.3d 1276, 1282 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Charlotte Amphitheater Corp. v.
NLRB, 82 F.3d 1074, 1080 (D.C. Cir. 1996); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. NLRB,
59 F.3d 230, 236 (D.C. Cir. 1995); Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers International
Union v. NLRB, 46 F.3d 82, 91 (D.C. Cir. 1995); Exxel/Atmos, Inc. v. NLRB, 28
F.3d 1243, 1249 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Gannett Rochester Newspapers v. NLRB, 988
F.2d 198, 205 (D.C. Cir. 1993); Sheet Metal Workers, Local Union No. 91 v. NLRB,
905 F.2d 417, 424 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local Union No.
474 v. NLRB, 814 F.2d 697, 699-700 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Darr v. NLRB, 801 F.2d
1404, 1409 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Local Union 1395, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers v.
NLRB, 797 F.2d 1027, 1036-37 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Prill v. NLRB, 755 F.2d 941, 942
(D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 948 (1985).
In the following cases, the D.C. Circuit cited its own precedent interpreting
Chenery in support of its decision to remand an NLRB order: Ark Las Vegas Res-
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contrast, other courts of appeals rarely used Chenery to remand NLRB
orders during this period.6 7 In the twenty years from 1964 to 1983,
the D.C. Circuit itself remanded only five NLRB orders based on Che-
nery.6 8 Finally, the Supreme Court did not remand any administra-
tive agency decision based on Chenery between 1984 and 2003.
Interestingly, the D.C. Circuit's use of Chenery to remand NLRB
orders cuts across political and ideological divides on the court, con-
founding predictions that the political party of the appointing Presi-
dent can predict judicial voting patterns. 69 Indeed, the D.C. Circuit's
taurant Corp. v. NLRB, 334 F.3d 99, 111 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (quoting United Food &
Commercial Workers International Union, Local 400, 222 F.3d at 1034); Randell
Warehouse of Arizona, Inc. v. NLRB, 252 F.3d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (citing
Darr, 801 F.2d at 1408-09); Jacoby v. NLRB, 233 F.3d 611, 617 (D.C. Cir. 2000)
(citing Prill, 755 F.2d at 947); NLRB v. McClatchy Newspapers, Inc., 964 F.2d
1153, 1169 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (quoting Prill, 755 F.2d at 942); Lima v. NLRB, 819
F.2d 300, 303-04 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (citing Darr, 801 F.2d at 1408-09 and Oil,
Chemical & Atomic Workers International Union, 806 F.2d at 273-74).
Finally, in two additional cases, the D.C. Circuit used language closely track-
ing the Chenery principle in support of its decision to remand an NLRB order:
ITT Industries, Inc. v. NLRB, 251 F.3d 995, 1004 (D.C. Cir. 2001) ("In determin-
ing whether an agency's interpretation represents a reasonable accomodation of
conflicting statutory purposes, a reviewing court must determine.., whether 'the
agency considered the matter in a detailed and reasoned fashion.'" (internal quo-
tation mark omitted)); Sullivan Industries v. NLRB, 957 F.2d 890, 905 n.12 (D.C.
Cir. 1992) ("[W]e emphasize that we harbor no disagreement with the Board's
policy choices. We ask only for a clear statement of what those choices and the
reasons for them are.").
67. The following are the relatively few cases in which courts of appeals other than
the D.C. Circuit used Chenery to remand NLRB orders during this period: Local
Joint Executive Board Of Las Vegas v. NLRB, 309 F.3d 578, 585, 586 (9th Cir.
2002); Edward C. Quirk Co. v. NLRB, 241 F.3d 41, 45-46 (1st Cir. 2001); Bro-
Tech Corp. v. NLRB, 105 F.3d 890, 896-98 (3d Cir. 1997); Louisiana-Pacific Corp.
v. NLRB, 52 F.3d 255, 258-60 (9th Cir. 1995); Esmark, Inc. v. NLRB, 887 F.2d
739, 758-60 (7th Cir. 1989); NLRB v. United States Postal Service, 827 F.2d 548,
555 (9th Cir. 1987); Harberson v. NLRB, 810 F.2d 977, 984 (10th Cir. 1987);
Slaughter v. NLRB, 794 F.2d 120, 122 (3d Cir. 1986); International Union, UAW
v. NLRB, 802 F.2d 969, 975 (7th Cir. 1986); Ewing v. NLRB, 768 F.2d 51, 54-55
(2d Cir. 1985).
In addition to these remands, the Seventh Circuit utilized Chenery to deny
enforcement to NLRB orders in the following cases: J.C. Penney Co. v. NLRB,
123 F.3d 988, 995, 999 (7th Cir. 1997); Guardian Industries Corp. v. NLRB, 49
F.3d 317, 322-23 (7th Cir. 1995); NLRB v. Special Mine Services, 11 F.3d 88, 90
(7th Cir. 1993); NLRB v. P*I*E Nationwide, Inc., 923 F.2d 506, 518 (7th Cir.
1991).
68. See Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 342 v. NLRB, 598 F.2d 216, 221-22 (D.C. Cir.
1979); Teamsters Local Union 769 v. NLRB, 532 F.2d 1385, 1391 (D.C. Cir. 1976);
Enterprise Ass'n of Steam, Pipefitters of N.Y. & Vicinity, Local Union No. 638 v.
NLRB, 521 F.2d 885 (D.C. Cir. 1975), rev'd, 424 U.S. 908 (1976); Mourning v.
NLRB, 505 F.2d 421, 424 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Textile Workers Union of America v.
NLRB, 475 F.2d 973, 976 n.9 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
69. See Brudney, Judicial Hostility, supra note 5, at 1761 (concluding that "personal,
political, and professional background factors . . .are significantly associated
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increased use of Chenery to remand NLRB orders in the mid-1980s
appears to be the result of efforts by judges appointed by President
Carter-especially Judge Harry Edwards-to police the Reagan-era
Board's overturning of long-established precedent that was protective
of workers. 70 In the wake of seven appointments by President Reagan
in the mid-1980s, "[t]he D.C. Circuit [became] more conservative polit-
ically;" however, as Professor Pierce has noted, "it [did] not become
more deferential to the politically accountable branches of govern-
ment."71 As a result, what began as a small trickle of cases applying
an aggressive and inflexible interpretation of Chenery to remand
NLRB orders for inadequate explanation of reasoning soon widened
into a veritable flood, with judges appointed by Presidents of both par-
ties regularly and vigorously applying the doctrine.
The timing of the D.C. Circuit's increased reliance on Chenery to
remand NLRB orders-immediately after the Supreme Court's Chev-
ron decision-raises suspicion that the D.C. Circuit is using Chenery
to avoid extending the deference it owes to the Board. In order to eval-
uate whether this is in fact the case, it is necessary to review the con-
tours of the Chenery doctrine and to take a closer look at how it has
been applied by the D.C. Circuit in specific cases.
III. THE CHENERY DOCTRINE AND ITS PROGENY
Neither the Supreme Court's opinions in the SEC v. Chenery cases
nor subsequent jurisprudence interpreting the decisions justifies the
D.C. Circuit's aggressive use of the Chenery doctrine to remand NLRB
orders. In the original Chenery opinions, the Supreme Court carefully
balanced its concern with ensuring that agencies provide courts with
an adequate basis for review with a warning against judicial interfer-
ence with agency policymaking. In subsequent decisions interpreting
the cases, the Court made clear that it considered the Chenery doc-
with a judge's propensity to support or reject the union's legal position"); Revesz,
supra note 5, at 1719 (concluding, based on study of decisions involving chal-
lenges to Environmental Protection Agency regulations, that "ideology signifi-
cantly influences judicial decisionmaking on the D.C. Circuit"). Of course, it may
be, as Professor Brudney suggests, that "the political saliency of union issues is
declining on a bipartisan basis," so that "[miore recent appointees of both parties
[are] more likely to reject the union's legal position than judges appointed in an
earlier era." Brudney, Judicial Hostility, supra note 5, at 1738.
70. See Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local Union No. 474, 814 F.2d at 699 (Edwards,
J.) (remanding Board decision establishing presumption "that there are only two
appropriate [bargaining] units in the health care industry"); Lima, 819 F.2d at
303-04 (Edwards, J.) (remanding Board order applying new strict rule defining
striker misconduct); Prill, 755 F.2d at 948 (Edwards, J.) (remanding Board deci-
sion reversing precedent to hold that individual employee's complaint to state
agency regarding workplace safety issue does not constitute protected "concerted
activit[y]" within the meaning of NLRA).
71. Pierce, supra note 2, at 304.
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trine to occupy a "limited office,"72 such that a reviewing court should
only use the doctrine to remand an administrative order if there is a
real possibility that but for the error the agency would have reached a
different result or if the reasoning is so unclear that the underlying
policy decision is truly in doubt. More recently, the Court has stated
that judicial review of the adequacy of agency decisions must be con-
ducted within the deferential framework required by cases such as
Vermont Yankee and Chevron and that the Chenery doctrine cannot be
used as an end-run around this required deference.
The SEC v. Chenery decisions 7 3 involved the rejection by the Se-
curities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") of a reorganization plan
filed by the Federal Water Service Corporation ("Federal"), as re-
quired by the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935.74 The SEC
rejected Federal's plan because it would allow "the management of the
company ... to participate in the reorganization on an equal footing
with all other preferred stock," which the SEC held would breach a
"duty of fair dealing" to shareholders. 75 In reaching its decision, the
SEC claimed that it was "acting only as it assumed a court of equity
would have acted in a similar case," relying on a series of judicial opin-
ions and "explicitly disavow[ing] any purpose of going beyond those
[policies] which the courts had theretofore recognized."
7 6
In Chenery I, the Supreme Court, with Justice Frankfurter writing
for the majority, held that the SEC had misread judicial precedent,
since "the courts do not impose upon officers and directors of a corpo-
ration any fiduciary duty to its stockholders which precludes them...
from buying and selling the corporation's stock."7 7 Although the SEC
had broad discretionary authority to "take appropriate action for the
correction of reorganization abuses found to be detrimental to the pub-
lic interest or the interest of investors or consumers,"' even without
relying on judicial precedent, the agency had failed to exercise this
authority in reaching its decision.7 8 Rather than reversing or recast-
ing the order so as to make it enforceable, however, the Court instead
remanded the case back to the SEC, so that "findings might [be] made
and considerations disclosed which would justify its order."79 Justice
72. Penn-Central Merger & N & W Inclusion Cases, 389 U.S. 486, 518 n.10 (1968).
73. SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery 11) 322 U.S. 194 (1947); SEC v. Chenery Corp.
(Chenery 1) 318 U.S. 80 (1943).
74. Act of Aug. 26, 1935, ch. 49, 49 Stat. 803 (1935) (repealed 2005).
75. Chenery I, 318 U.S. at 81, 85; see also Federal Water Service Corporation, 8
S.E.C. 893, 915-17 (1941) (concluding that the reorganization plan for Federal, of
which C.T. Chenery was president, would violate the corporate directors' fiduci-
ary duties).
76. Chenery 1, 318 U.S. at 87, 89.
77. Id. at 88.
78. Id. at 92 (citations omitted).
79. Id. at 94.
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Frankfurter explained that an agency action "cannot be upheld merely
because findings might have been made and considerations disclosed
which would justify its order."so Rather, "the orderly functioning of
the process of review requires that the grounds upon which the admin-
istrative agency acted be clearly disclosed and adequately sus-
tained."81 "'The administrative process,"' the Court added, "'will best
be vindicated by clarity in its exercise."'8 2
Justice Frankfurter took care to explain, however, that the Court's
holding was not an invitation for courts to commandeer administra-
tive policymaking:
In finding that the Commission's order cannot be sustained, we are not impos-
ing any trammels on its powers. We are not enforcing formal requirements.
We are not suggesting that the Commission must justify its exercise of admin-
istrative discretion in any particular manner or with artistic refinement. We
are not sticking in the bark of words. We merely hold that an administrative
order cannot be upheld unless the grounds upon which the agency acted in
exercising its powers were those upon which its action can be sustained.
8 3
Quoting his own opinion in Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB,84 Frank-
furter declared that:
We do not intend to enter the province that belongs to the Board, nor do we do
so. All we ask of the Board is to give clear indication that it has exercised the
discretion with which Congress has empowered it. This is to affirm most em-
phatically the authority of the Board.
8 5
80. Id. (emphasis added).
81. Id.
82. Id. (quoting Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 197 (1941) (Frankfurter,
83. Id. at 95.
84. 313 U.S. 177 (1941). Phelps Dodge, an important precursor to Justice Frank-
furter's opinion in Chenery, involved an NLRB decision holding that an employer
must offer reinstatement to workers fired because of their union activity notwith-
standing the fact that they had subsequently obtained employment elsewhere.
The Court remanded the order because, although "the mere fact that the victim of
discrimination has obtained equivalent employment does not preclude the Board
from undoing the discrimination and requiring employment," the agency had
failed to adequately "disclose the basis of its order." Id. at 193-94, 197.
85. Chenery I, 318 U.S. at 94-95 (quoting Phelps Dodge, 313 U.S. at 197). Despite
the limitations that Justice Frankfurter placed on his holding in Chenery I, Jus-
tice Hugo Black penned a spirited dissent, explaining:
I do not suppose, as the Court does, that the Commission's rule is not
fully based on Commission experience. The Commission did not "explic-
itly disavow" any reliance on what its members had learned in their
years of experience, and of course they, as trade experts, made their find-
ings that respondent's practice was "detrimental to the interests of in-
vestors" in the light of their knowledge. That they did not unduly parade
fact data across the pages of their reports is a commendable saving of
effort since they meant merely to announce for their own jurisdiction an
obvious rule of honest dealing. Of course, the Commission can now
change the form of its decision to comply with the Court order. The Court
can require the Commission to use more words; but it seems difficult to
imagine how more words or different words could further illuminate its
2008]
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On remand, the SEC once again rejected Federal's reorganization
plan, this time justifying its action by reference to its own expertise
rather than to Supreme Court precedent.8 6 The Commission ex-
plained that "[ol ur study of and experience with corporate reorganiza-
tions have made us cognizant that many evils have occurred in the
course of recapitalizations and reorganizations effected through man-
agement plans without the supervision of any court or regulatory
body" and referenced one of its own reports on the subject.8 7 Federal
appealed this second order as well.
In Chenery II, a new Supreme Court majority upheld the SEC's
decision,8 8 explaining that it "definitely avoids the fatal error of rely-
ing on judicial precedents which do not sustain it" and noting that the
agency "has drawn heavily upon its accumulated experience in dealing
with utility regulation. And it has expressed its reasons with a clarity
and thoroughness that admit of no doubt as to the underlying basis of
the order."8 9 The majority rejected an expansive reading of the origi-
nal Chenery I decision urged by Justice Jackson's dissent,90 explain-
ing that in the "prior decision ... [w]e held no more and no less than
that the Commission's first order was unsupportable for the reasons
purpose or its determination. A judicial requirement of circumstantially
detailed findings as the price of court approval can bog the administra-
tive power in a quagmire of minutiae. Hypercritical exactions as to find-
ings can provide a handy but almost invisible glideway enabling courts
to pass "from the narrow confines of law into the more spacious domain
of policy."
Id. at 98-99 (Black, J., dissenting) (quoting Phelps-Dodge, 313 U.S. at 194).
Judge Friendly later expressed his agreement with the essence of Justice Black's
reasoning, suggesting that
there is a fair basis for debate whether Justice Frankfurter's reading of
the SEC's report in Chenery was not, to say the least, ungenerous. Cer-
tainly it would have been possible to write an opinion affirming the Com-
mission on the basis that, in fact, it had considered the lessons of
experience as well as what it erroneously thought had been the decisions
of the courts.
Henry J. Friendly, The "Limited Office" of the Chenery Decision, 21 ADMIN. L.
REV. 1, 3 (1968).
86. Fed. Water Serv. Corp., 15 S.E.C. 849, 864 (1944).
87. Id. at 865 (referring to the SEC's "Report on the Study and Investigation of the
Work, Activities, Personnel and Functions of Protective and Reorganization
Committees").
88. Between the Chenery I and Chenery II decisions, Chief Justice Stone and Justice
Robert left the Court and Justices Vinson, Burton, and Rutledge joined it. STE-
PHEN G. BREYER, ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAw AND REGULATORY POLICY 449 n.2
(3d ed. 1999).
89. SEC v. Chenery (Chenery II), 332 U.S. 194, 199 (1947).
90. Justice Jackson argued that the SEC's mere act of "recast[ing] its rationale [to]
reach[ ] the same result" was insufficient, since "[iut makes judicial review ... a
hopeless formality" and "reduces the judicial process ... to a mere feint." Id. at
210. (Jackson, J., dissenting). Justice Frankfurter, who wrote the majority's deci-
sion in Chenery I, joined the dissent.
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supplied by that agency."9 1 "Our duty," the Court explained, "is at an
end when it becomes evident that the Commission's action is based
upon substantial evidence and is consistent with the authority
granted by Congress."9 2
Although the Supreme Court applied the Chenery doctrine to re-
mand agency orders through the mid-1970s, 9 3 the general trend of the
Court's post-Chenery decisions has been, in Professor Kenneth Davis'
words, a "soften[ing] in [the rule's] application."94 In Massachusetts
Trustees of Eastern Gas and Fuel Associates v. United States,95 for ex-
ample, the Supreme Court stated that the purpose of Chenery was
merely to "assur[e] that initial administrative determinations are
made with the relevant criteria in mind and in a proper procedural
manner."96 A remand is therefore not warranted "when a mistake of
the administrative body is one that clearly had no bearing on the pro-
cedure used or the substance of the decision reached." 97 Similarly, in
NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co.,98 Justice Fortas, writing for a plurality,
stated that "Chenery does not require that we convert judicial review
of agency action into a ping-pong game;" when "[t]here is not the
slightest uncertainty as to the outcome of a proceeding before the
Board .... It would be meaningless to remand."9 9 Summarizing this
trend, D.C. Circuit Judge Harold Leventhal explained: "The Supreme
Court's opinions reflect the concern that agencies not be reversed for
error that is not prejudicial."1oo In a similar vein, a number of circuit
91. Id. at 200.
92. Id. at 206.
93. Most notable are two decisions in which the Supreme Court added further glosses
to the basic Chenery principle. In Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States,
the Court held that "courts may not accept appellate counsel's post hoc rational-
izations for agency action; Chenery requires that an agency's discretionary order
be upheld, if at all, on the same basis articulated in the order by the agency it-
self." 371 U.S. 156, 168-69 (1962). In Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v.
Wichita Bd. of Trade, the Court held that when an agency departs from its prior
precedent, "it must.., clearly set forth [the ground for its departure] so that the
reviewing court may understand the basis of the agency's action and so may
judge the consistency of that action with the agency's mandate." 412 U.S. 800,
808 (1973). Other examples of Chenery remands from this period include the fol-
lowing cases: Fed. Power Comm'n v. Texaco, Inc., 417 U.S. 380 (1974); Camp v.
Pitts, 411 U.S. 138 (1973); Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405
U.S. 233 (1972); and NLRB v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 380 U.S. 438 (1965).
94. 3 KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE §14:29, at 130 (2d ed.
1980).
95. 377 U.S. 235 (1964).
96. Id. at 248.
97. Id.
98. 394 U.S. 759 (1969).
99. Id. at 766-67 n.6 (Fortas, J.).
100. Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 379 F.2d 453, 466 (D.C. Cir. 1967)
(Leventhal, J.).
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courts have concluded that "[tihe harmless-error doctrine . . .is an
exception to the Chenery principle." 10 1
In addition to applying an implicit harmless-error test to Chenery
remands, the Supreme Court has made clear that reviewing courts
should, in Judge Friendly's words, uphold agency orders "where ade-
quate findings can be discerned,. . . with a modicum of judicial benev-
olence, even though the ribbons have not been neatly tied."102 In
Bowman Transportation, Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight System,
Inc.,103 for example, the Court, while acknowledging that Chenery re-
quires that it "may not supply a reasoned basis for the agency's action
that the agency itself has not given," held that it would nonetheless
"uphold a decision of less than ideal clarity if the agency's path may
reasonably be discerned." 10 4 In the post-Chevron case of National
Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Boston & Maine Corp.,105 the Court went
even further, accepting an interpretation of the dispositive statutory
term offered by the Interstate Commerce Commission for the first
time in its briefs to the Supreme Court.1 0 6 The Court explained that
"Chenery does not require a remand" in this situation, since "the only
reasonable reading of the Commission's opinion, and the only plausi-
ble explanation of the issues .. .is that the ICC's decision was based
on the proffered interpretation." 0 7
The Supreme Court's invocation of the Chenery cases as support
for its holdings in the landmark administrative law decisions of Ver-
mont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Coun-
cil, Inc.lo8 and Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Counsel, Inc. 109 underlines the point that Chenery remands cannot be
used by a court to avoid required deference to agency policymaking.
In Vermont Yankee, the Court quoted Chenery II in rejecting the D.C.
Circuit's attempt to dictate "the methods, procedures, and time dimen-
sion" of agency decisionmaking, stating that such efforts "clearly
run[] the risk of 'propel[ling] the court into the domain which Con-
gress has set aside exclusively for the administrative agency." 110
Similarly, in Chevron, the Court cited Chenery I as one of several
cases standing for "the principle of deference to administrative inter-
101. Sahara Coal Co. v. Office of Workers' Comp. Programs, 946 F.2d 554, 558 (7th
Cir. 1991); see also cases listed supra note 28.
102. Friendly, supra note 17, at 218.
103. 419 U.S. 281 (1974).
104. Id. at 285-86. The Court reiterated this holding in its decision in Motor Vehicles
Mfg. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983).
105. 503 U.S. 407 (1992).
106. Id. at 426-27 (White, J., dissenting).
107. Id. at 420.
108. 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
109. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
110. Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. at 545 (quoting SEC v. Chenery (Chenery II), 332 U.S.
194, 196 (1947)).
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pretations" in support of its holding that "considerable weight should
be accorded to an executive department's construction of a statutory
scheme it is entrusted to administer."1" Indeed, in the few instances
in which the Court has cited the Chenery decisions since Chevron, it
has continued to interpret them as standing for the principle of judi-
cial deference to agency policymaking.112 Most strikingly, the Court
has not utilized Chenery to remand an agency decision for inadequate
reasoning since Chevron was decided, more than two decades ago.
IV. THE D.C. CIRCUIT'S USE OF CHENERY
IN REMANDING NLRB ORDERS
Despite the clear line of Supreme Court authority indicating that
the Chenery doctrine should be applied so as to protect agency decision
making authority, a review of D.C. Circuit cases decided between 1984
and 2003 that involved the NLRB demonstrates that the court has
instead applied the principle in a manner that interferes with the
agency's delegated authority. The D.C. Circuit remanded routine
cases even when it was clear the Board would reach the same decision
upon further review, applied the requirement that the Board explain
its departure from precedent so strictly as to inhibit its ability to
change policy, and utilized Chenery in a manner that frustrates the
Board's ability to pursue its chosen remedies for employer violations of
the NLRA.
A. Unnecessary Remands of Routine Cases
In a number of routine representation cases, the D.C. Circuit has
remanded NLRB orders even though it was clear that the Board
would reach the same decision upon further review. Not only are such
remands unnecessary under the Supreme Court's interpretation of
Chenery, but the court's refusal to enforce such routine decisions has
led to significant delays in the enforcement of NLRB orders and a sub-
stantial waste of administrative and judicial resources.
111. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844-45.
112. See, e.g., INS v. Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 16 (2002) (per curiam) (quoting SEC v.
Chenery (Chenery I), 318 U.S. 80, 88 (1943) in reversing Ninth Circuit's refusal to
remand asylum decision back to immigration service for reconsideration in light
of changed conditions, stating that in these circumstances a "judicial judgment
cannot be made to do service for an administrative judgment"); Gonzales v.
Thomas, 547 U.S. 183 (2006) (per curiam) (reiterating holding of Ventura in simi-
lar case); Dept. of Treasury v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 494 U.S. 922, 933
(1990) (citing Chenery I as support for Chevron's command that "an agency is
charged with ... giv[ing] reasonable content to [a] statute's textual ambiguities"
and that this "is not a task that we ought to undertake on the agency's behalf in
reviewing its orders.").
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For example, in Macmillan Publishing Co. v. NLRB,113 the D.C.
Circuit remanded an NLRB order overturning a representation elec-
tion on the basis of an anti-union leaflet distributed by the employer
that stated: "Without a union, Macmillan will be free to proceed ahead
with the announced wage increases .... With a union, since all wages
and benefits would be subject to negotiation, no one can predict what
the final wage package would be. WHY TAKE THE RISK? VOTE
NO!"114 The court found that the NLRB Regional Director's analysis
of the leaflet-that "'[ilt is well settled that, during a union organizing
campaign, an employer should decide the question of granting or with-
holding benefits as it would if a union were not in the picture"' 1 1 5-
was "inscrutable," commenting that "[tihere is no such principle gov-
erning employer communications during election campaigns, and we
doubt that there could be in light of the First Amendment."1 16 The
court therefore remanded the Board's decision, holding that "[t]he Re-
gional Director's judgment rested on no sound principle" and citing
Chenery for the proposition that a court "cannot sustain agency action
on grounds other than those adopted by the agency in the administra-
tive proceedings.",1
7
As a result of the D.C. Circuit's remand, the NLRB ordered that a
hearing be held before an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") to con-
sider the full complement of the union's original eight objections to the
election.118 The ALJ found three of these objections to have merit,
including the original objection concerning the leaflet. 119 The ALJ
stated that: "[T]he leaflet explicitly states that the promised wage in-
crease will be put in jeopardy if the employees choose the Union. As
such, it clearly interfered with the [employees'] exercise of free choice
in the election."12o The NLRB affirmed the ALJ's decision, reiterating
that "the Respondent's distribution of the leaflet threatening with-
drawal of a promised wage increase, just days before the election, was
objectionable and independently sufficient to set aside the
election."121
The employer once again petitioned the D.C. Circuit for review.122
This time the court affirmed the Board's order, explaining that: "The
settled law is clear: to state that a previously-announced wage in-
crease will probably be lost if a union wins constitutes employer coer-
113. 194 F.3d 165 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
114. Id. at 166.
115. Id. at 168 (quoting Regional Director's decision).
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Pearson Education, Inc., 336 N.L.R.B. 979, 979 (2001).
119. Id. at 979-80.
120. Id. at 979 (internal quotations omitted).
121. Id.
122. Pearson Education, Inc. v. NLRB, 373 F.3d 127 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
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cion.... We agree with the Board that this constitutes classic coercive
conduct."123 After stating that it "agree[d] with the Board that the
company's distribution of the leaflet was objectionable conduct 'inde-
pendently sufficient to set aside the election,"124 the court stated that
it did "not need to reach the additional allegations" considered by the
NLRB on remand. i 25 The court thus ended up enforcing the Board's
order on the precise ground that it had rejected in the case's previous
trip to the court-resulting in a four and a half year delay in the en-
forcement of the NLRB's order as well as a significant expenditure of
agency resources to rehear the election objections.' 2 6
Sundor Brands, Inc. v. NLRB127 is another example of a remand of
a routine order where "with a modicum of judicial benevolence" the
Board's decision could have been affirmed "even though the ribbons
ha[d] not been neatly tied."128 The case involved an NLRB unit deter-
mination that five subclassifications of technical employees should be
included in a skilled maintenance bargaining unit based on their
shared community of interest.' 29 The employer objected to the unit
determination. As a result, after the union won an election to re-
present the unit by a margin of 15 to 6, the employer refused to bar-
gain.' 3 0 The Board determined that this was an unfair labor practice.
The employer appealed to the D.C. Circuit.13i
The court recognized that "the Board's unit determination, if sup-
ported by substantial evidence, is entitled to 'wide deference. '"" 32 The
court refused to enforce the order, however, because the Board had not
adequately explained all of the factors on which it might have relied in
making its community of interest determination.133 The court ac-
knowledged that under the NLRB's own precedent, "[n]o one factor is
controlling" in such a determination, 134 but the court refused to reach
the issue of "whether the factors for which there is support in the re-
cord could suffice by themselves to support the Board's present unit
determination."135 Instead, the court remanded the agency's order,
citing Chenery I as support for the proposition that "Itihe grounds
123. Id at 131.
124. Id. at 132 (quoting Pearson, 336 N.L.R.B. at 979).
125. Id.
126. The D.C. Circuit issued its original decision remanding the NLRB order in Mac-
Millan Publishing on November 12, 1999. The court ultimately enforced the
Board's order in Pearson Education on July 6, 2004.
127. 168 F.3d 515 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
128. Friendly, supra note 17, at 218.
129. Sundor Brands, Inc., 325 N.L.R.B. 499, 499 (1998).
130. Id.
131. Sundor Brands, 168 F.3d at 517.
132. Id. at 518 (citations omitted).
133. Id. at 519.
134. Id. (citing Airco, Inc., 273 N.L.R.B. 348, 348 (1984)).
135. Id. at 520.
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upon which an administrative order must be judged are those upon
which the record discloses that its action was based."136
Considering the case again on remand, the Board "adhere[d] to
[its] previous finding that the petitioned-for skilled maintenance unit
[was] appropriate."13 7 The NLRB explained that, by "longstanding
policy" it "does not require all factors to be present in order to find a
petitioned-for maintenance unit appropriate;" rather, "'collective bar-
gaining units must be based upon all the relevant evidence in each
individual case."' 138 In the case before it, the Board stated, "the fac-
tors found by the court to be supported by substantial evidence on the
record . . . . are sufficient support for our conclusion that the peti-
tioned-for maintenance employees are a readily identifiable group
with a distinct community of interest and are an appropriate unit for
bargaining."13
9
Following the Board's decision, the employer appealed to the D.C.
Circuit a second time. This time, the court held that one of the factors
on which the NLRB had relied in making its unit determination was
not supported by substantial evidence in the record. 140 Since the
Board had failed to "distinguish between the factors upon which it re-
lied," the D.C. Circuit stated, a remand to the agency was once again
necessary.14 1 Based on a review of published agency orders, the
NLRB does not appear to have attempted to issue its unit determina-
tion a third time in the face of these two judicial remands.
B. Remands Based on Strict Requirements of Distinguishing
Precedent
In a number of other cases, the D.C. Circuit has invoked the Che-
nery doctrine to remand NLRB orders because of the Board's failure to
adequately distinguish its own precedent.142 Although it is beyond
136. Id. at 519 (quoting SEC v. Chenery (Chenery 1), 318 U.S. 80, 87 (1943)).
137. Sundor Brands, Inc., 334 N.L.R.B. 755, 755 (2001).
138. Id. at 756 (quoting American Cyanamid Co., 131 N.L.R.B. 909, 911 (1961)).
139. Id.
140. Sundor Brands, Inc. v. NLRB, No. 01-1338, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 22482, *4-5
(D.C. Cir. Oct. 24, 2002).
141. Id. at *5-6.
142. In addition to the cases discussed infra, see Speedrack Prod. Group, Ltd. v.
NLRB, 114 F.3d 1276 (D.C. Cir. 1997), citing Chenery in remanding a Board deci-
sion holding that a group of prison work-release inmates were ineligible to vote in
a representation election because the NLRB allegedly "ignored its own precedent
without offering any explanation as to why this precedent was inapplicable." Id.
at 1279. In fact, in its underlying decision, the Board explicitly found that "[tihe
factual situation presented here has not occurred before" and that "[t]he cases on
which our [dissenting] colleague relies are distinguishable." Speedrack Prod.
Group, Ltd., 320 N.L.R.B. 627, 628 (1995). In Lemoyne-Owen College v. NLRB,
357 F.3d 55 (D.C. Cir. 2004), the D.C. Circuit remanded a Board decision finding
a college faculty bargaining unit appropriate because "the [NLRB] Regional Di-
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dispute that "an agency action is arbitrary and capricious if it repre-
sents an unexplained departure from the agency's prior policies and
precedent,"1 43 the Supreme Court made clear in Chevron that such a
rule cannot be so strictly applied so as to prevent an agency from re-
considering "the wisdom of its policy on a continuing basis,"1 4 4 includ-
ing occasionally overruling its own decisions.14
5
In Randell Warehouse of Arizona, Inc. v. NLRB,146 the D.C. Circuit
remanded an NLRB decision that reversed Board policy on the ques-
tion of whether and when it is objectionable for a union to photograph
employees involved in an organizing campaign. The NLRB's guiding
precedent at the time, Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co.,147 held that
photographing or videotaping of employees constituted an unfair labor
practice "[a]bsent any legitimate explanation from the Union" since
"employees could reasonably believe that the Union was contemplat-
ing some future reprisals against them."148 In the facts of Randell
Warehouse, "union representatives took photographs of other union
representatives distributing union literature outside the Employer's
facility. These photographs necessarily included both employees who
accepted and those who rejected proffered literature."149 When asked
by an employee why the pictures were being taken, a union represen-
tative would only say, "It's for the union purpose."' 5 0 The union won
the election and the employer filed an objection with the NLRB. Sig-
naling that it was considering changing its precedent on the topic, the
Board issued a notice of hearing, scheduling oral argument and invit-
ing amicus curiae to file briefs and participate.15 1
rector did not discuss any of the cases the College had cited." Id. at 59. The court
acknowledged that "[a]n agency is by no means required to distinguish every pre-
cedent cited to it by an aggrieved party," but nevertheless held that Chenery re-
quired a remand in order to "provide a legitimate basis for sustaining agency
action." Id. at 61.
143. RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 8.5, at 547 (4th ed. 2002)
(discussing Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. v. Wichita Bd. of Trade, 412 U.S.
800 (1973)).
144. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Counsel, 467 U.S. 837, 863-64 (1984).
145. Even former D.C. Circuit Judge David Bazelon, who was partial to the use of
Chenery remands as a part of his broader effort to ensure the adequacy of agency
procedures, recognized the limits of the application of the doctrine to this require-
ment, stating that "Itihe Board cannot be expected, on pain of reversal, to antici-
pate and distinguish every marginal case that a litigant might uncover in
preparing a petition for review." Teamster Local Union 769 v. NLRB, 532 F.2d
1385, 1392 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (Bazelon, J.).
146. 252 F.3d 445 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
147. 289 N.L.R.B. 736 (1988).
148. Id. at 737.
149. Randell Warehouse of Arizona, Inc., 328 N.L.R.B. 1034, 1034 (1999).
150. Id.
151. Id. Amici curiae who filed briefs and participated in oral argument included the
American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations, the
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In its decision, the NLRB overturned its precedent, explaining that
"we have concluded that the standard for union photographing of em-
ployees in a pre-election setting established by Pepsi-Cola Bottling is
inconsistent with Board law involving union inquiry into employees'
sentiments respecting representation," such as "cases permitting un-
ions to ask employees directly whether they support the union, to at-
tempt to persuade employees to sign petitions in support of
representation, and to record the employees' responses."152 The
Board therefore "overrule[d] Pepsi-Cola and reject[ed] its premise that
union photographing or videotaping of employees engaged in pro-
tected activities during an election campaign, without more, necessa-
rily interferes with employee free choice." 15 3 The Board declined to
overturn another of its precedents regarding union filming of employ-
ees, Mike Yurosek & Son, Inc.,154 which held that union videotaping of
anti-union employees accompanied by threats constituted an unfair
labor practice. The Board made clear that the case before it was not
governed by the rule of Mike Yurosek, since "no threats of this charac-
ter, attributable to the Union, are present in the instant case."155 One
NLRB Member concurred in the result, agreeing with the majority
that "the act of photographing is not inherently coercive," but pro-
testing the Board's failure to overrule its precedent holding that "iden-
tical conduct when engaged in by an employer is presumptively
coercive."156 Another Member dissented, stating that he would up-
hold Pepsi-Cola as sound precedent and find the union's filming of em-
ployees in this case to constitute an unfair labor practice. 1 57
The employer petitioned the D.C. Circuit for review of the NLRB's
decision.1 5 8 The court refused to enforce the order, holding that "the
Board erred by failing to consider the applicability of Mike Yurosek
here" and criticizing the Board for "silent departure from prece-
dent."15 9 In particular, the court stated, the NLRB was obliged to ex-
plain why threatening statements made by individual pro-union
employees-although not proximate in space or time to the
Council on Labor Law Equality, the Labor Policy Association, and the Interna-
tional Brotherhood of Teamsters. Id.
152. Id. at 1036.
153. Id.
154. 292 N.L.R.B. 1074 (1989).
155. Randell Warehouse of Arizona, Inc., 328 N.L.R.B. 1034, 1036 (1999).
156. Id. at 1038 (Member Brame, concurring) (discussing F.W. Woolworth Co., 310
N.L.R.B. 1197 (1993)).
157. Id. at 1049 (Member Hurtgen, dissenting).
158. Randell Warehouse of Arizona, Inc. v. NLRB, 252 F.3d 445, 446 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
159. Id. at 448 (quoting Cleveland Constr. Inc. v. NLRB, 44 F.3d 1010, 1016 (D.C. Cir.
1995)).
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photographing incident160-when put together with the filming "did
not amount to objectionable conduct under [Mike Yurosek]."161 The
D.C. Circuit reached this conclusion despite acknowledging that the
NLRB Hearing Officer had decided that these threatening statements
on their own terms did not amount to objectionable conduct and de-
spite the fact that neither the NLRB majority opinion, the concur-
rence, nor the dissent considered the statements relevant to a Mike
Yurosek analysis.162 The court remanded the case, citing D.C. Circuit
precedent interpreting Chenery as holding that a remand is required
where the Board "did not clearly explain [the] basis for its deci-
sion."163 Over five years later, and seven years after the NLRB's orig-
inal decision in the case, a new Board, now with a majority of
members appointed by President George W. Bush, issued a new deci-
sion in the case, reversing course and effectively reaffirming the rule
of Pepsi-Cola Bottling, thus avoiding the need to conduct the analysis
demanded by the court.
164
In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. NLRB,165 by contrast, the court re-
fused to accept the agency's interpretation and application of its own
precedent. The case involved the court's review of an unfair labor
practice charge against an employer for "transferring certain employ-
ees from one corporate division to another ... reclassif[ying] them out
of a bargaining unit."'16 6 The employer argued that its actions were
permitted by its collective bargaining agreement with the union and
that the dispute should therefore be decided by an arbitrator rather
than the Board. 16 7  The NLRB disagreed, stating that
"[riepresentation issues.., are matters for decision exclusively by the
Board, not an arbitrator," and issued an order adverse to the em-
ployer.' 68 The employer petitioned for review in the D.C. Circuit, cit-
ing several cases in support of the proposition that "the Board's
160. Apart from the photographing incident, the NLRB Hearing Officer found that
several pro-union employees made threatening statements in the weeks leading
up to the election. Randell Warehouse, 328 N.L.R.B. at 1053-54.
161. Randell Warehouse, 252 F.3d at 449.
162. The NLRB Hearing Officer held that since "[n]one of the individuals who were
alleged to have engaged in unlawful threats ... were shown to have been union
officers, representatives, or agents ... the Union cannot be held accountable for
such conduct." Randell Warehouse, 328 N.L.R.B. at 1054.
163. Randell Warehouse, 252 F.3d at 449 (citing Lima v. NLRB, 819 F.2d 300, 303
(D.C. Cir. 1987) and Darr v. NLRB, 801 F.2d 1404, 1408-09 (D.C. Cir. 1986)).
164. Randell Warehouse of Arizona, Inc., 347 N.L.R.B. No. 56 (July 26, 2006).
165. 59 F.3d 230 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
166. Id. at 231.
167. Id.
168. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 312 N.L.R.B. 373, 375 (1993).
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general policy is to defer to arbitration whenever the parties' agree-
ment provides for arbitration."
169
While acknowledging that "the Board has discretion to choose
whether to defer to arbitration," the panel refused to enforce the
NLRB's order because "the Board's categorical statement that 'repre-
sentational issues' are not susceptible to resolution by contract does
not square with Board precedent," noting that "McDonnell Douglas
points to several cases in which an employer has been compelled, pur-
suant to a collective bargaining agreement, to arbitrate a dispute
about the agreed-upon scope of the bargaining unit."170 Analyzing the
precedent relied on by the Board, the court concluded that the agency
had misinterpreted its own decisions.17 1 The D.C. Circuit remanded
the case, citing Chenery as support for its conclusion that it "cannot
definitively review [the Board's decision not to defer to arbitration] in
the absence of some explanation by the Board."1
72
Upon considering the case again on remand, the NLRB expressed
its "regret [for] using such overbroad language" in explaining its posi-
tion on deferral and representation issues. 173 The Board clarified that
it "'only infrequently defers to arbitration in representation proceed-
ings,' [and that] deferral is appropriate 'when the resolution of the is-
sue turns solely on the proper interpretation of the parties'
contract.'"174 The case before it, the Board held, involved both a "con-
tract interpretation issue" and an issue of "statutory policy, i.e., an
analysis of community-of-interest factors" and therefore only part of
the case was appropriate for deferral.17 5 The NLRB nevertheless ac-
quiesced in the strong suggestion implicit in the D.C. Circuit's re-
mand, deferring to an arbitrator regarding both issues. 176 The Board
emphasized, however, that it had reached this decision because of "the
unique circumstances of this case, including the fact of the court's re-
mand," stating that it was "only making an exception to, and most
decidedly not abandoning, our long-standing general policy.., against
deferral of representation issues which can only be resolved through
application of statutory policy."1
7 7
169. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. NLRB, 59 F.3d 230, 234 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (citing
Hammontree v. NLRB 925 F.2d 1486 (D.C. Cir. 1991); United Technologies
Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 557, 559 (1984); Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. 837
(1971)).
170. Id.
171. Id. at 235-36.
172. Id. at 236.
173. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 324 N.L.R.B. 1202, 1205 (1997).
174. Id. (citing St. Mary's Med. Ctr., 322 N.L.R.B. 954 (1997)).
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. (emphasis added).
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C. Remands Based on Disagreement with NLRB Remedies
In a series of cases involving the NLRB's use of "affirmative bar-
gaining orders" as a remedy for employer unfair labor practices, the
D.C. Circuit has used the Chenery doctrine to frustrate the agency's
ability to utilize its chosen remedy, despite the Supreme Court's hold-
ing in NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co. 178 that the Board has considerable
discretionary authority to issue such orders. 17 9 The heightened ex-
planatory requirements the D.C. Circuit has demanded from the
Board for affirmative bargaining orders appear less rooted in procedu-
ral concerns with reasoned decisionmaking than with expressing the
court's substantive disagreement with this particular agency policy
choice.
The debate between the panel majority and dissent in Sullivan In-
dustries v. NLRB180 provides a useful illustration of the issues in-
volved in this area. The case involved a unionized company which
declared bankruptcy and was purchased by a new owner.181 Although
the new owner was required by law to recognize and bargain with the
incumbent union,' 8 2 he refused.' 8 3 Then, after several months, the
owner relented and recognized the union.18 4 Two days later, however,
he withdrew recognition, relying on a petition signed by a majority of
employees stating that they did not "wish to be represented by... any
union at this time."' 8 5 The union filed unfair labor practice charges
against the employer for refusing to bargain and unlawfully with-
drawing recognition.18 6
The NLRB upheld both charges, affirming the ALJ's finding that
the employer "was not justified in withholding recognition" and that
"[b]y doing so... improperly undermined the union's majority status,
thereby tainting the employee petition."187 As a remedy, the NLRB
ordered the company to cease and desist from refusing to recognize the
union and, in addition, issued an affirmative bargaining order1SS-
178. 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
179. Id. at 610 ("We have long held that the Board is not limited to a cease-and-desist
order.., but has the authority to issue a bargaining order without first requiring
the union to show that it has been able to maintain its majority status.").
180. 957 F.2d 890 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
181. Sullivan Indus., Inc., 302 N.L.R.B. 144, 145 (1991).
182. See NLRB v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs., Inc., 406 U.S. 272, 279 (1972) (upholding
Board rule that a successor employer must recognize and bargain with an incum-
bent union "if a majority of employees after the change of ownership or manage-
ment were employed by the preceding employer.").
183. Sullivan Indus., 302 N.L.R.B. at 145-46.
184. Id. at 146-47.
185. Id. at 147 (quoting Respondent's Exhibit 7(a), Sullivan Indus., Inc., 302 N.L.R.B.
144 (March 21, 1991) (Nos. 1-CA-25698 & 1-CA-25869)).
186. Id. at 144.
187. Id. at 149.
188. Id. at 151.
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"the traditional ... remedy for restoration of the status quo after the
unlawful refusal of an employer to recognize and bargain with an in-
cumbent union which was the majority representative."189 The em-
ployer petitioned the D.C. Circuit for review.190
Judge Patricia Wald, writing for the panel majority, 19 1 enforced
the NLRB's decision in so far as it held that the employer had commit-
ted unfair labor practices by refusing to bargain and withdrawing rec-
ognition from the union, but refused to enforce the Board's affirmative
bargaining order remedy. 1 92 Referring to affirmative bargaining or-
ders as "an extreme remedy" 19 3 and expressing particular concern
with the impact of the "decertification bar" on the rights of employees
to rid themselves of the union,19 4 the majority relied on a pre-Chevron
precedent, Peoples Gas System, Inc. v. NLRB,195 to hold that it would
not enforce an affirmative bargaining order unless the NLRB first
explained:
(1) that it gave due consideration to employees' section 7 rights ... (2) why it
concluded that other purposes must override the rights of employees to choose
their bargaining representatives and (3) why other remedies, less destructive
to employees' rights, are not adequate.
1 9 6
Finding that the Board's decision in the case at bar lacked a "reasoned
explanation" of these judicially-created factors, the court vacated the
bargaining order and remanded, paraphrasing Chenery: "[W]e empha-
size that we harbor no disagreement with the Board's policy choices.
We ask only for a clear statement of what those choices and the rea-
sons for them are."197
Judge Laurence Silberman concurred in the holding that the em-
ployer had used unfair labor practices, but dissented from the major-
189. Williams Enters., Inc., 312 N.L.R.B. 937, 940 (1993), enforced, NLRB v. Williams
Enters., Inc., 50 F.3d 1280 (4th Cir. 1995) (The Board emphasized that "[tihis
remedy applies regardless of whether the wrongdoing employer is original or a
successor to the statutory obligation to bargain with the incumbent union.").
190. Sullivan Indus. v. NLRB, 957 F.2d 890, 891 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
191. Judge Wald was joined in the majority by Judge (now Justice) Ruth Bader Gins-
burg. Id. at 891.
192. Id. at 903.
193. Id.
194. As the panel majority explained:
The decertification bar would last for a "reasonable period"-at least six
months, perhaps as much as one year-during which time the employer
and the union would presumably bargain. If a collective bargaining
agreement were reached during this period, the decertification period
would be extended, by virtue of the contract bar, for an additional three
years. At no time during this period would the employees be able to
challenge the union's majority status.
Id. at 903 n.5.
195. 629 F.2d 35 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
196. Sullivan Indus., 957 F.2d at 903 (quoting Peoples Gas, 629 F.2d at 46).
197. Id. at 905 n.12.
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ity's refusal to enforce the Board's affirmative bargaining order
remedy.' 98 He explained that:
It is fair to contend that the Board has not explained, as clearly as it could, its
position on the issue-at least as it is presented in this case-although the
Board is not required to distinguish other cases that are inapposite. I feel
obliged to dissent, however, because I thing the board's path is discernable...
and, more important, because the majority opinion appears to question the
Board's remedial judgment.1 9 9
The NLRB's decision to utilize an affirmative bargaining order, Judge
Silberman argued, "is not an inevitable remedial choice, but it is
hardly an irrational or unorthodox one" and had been applied by the
Board in numerous prior cases. 200 Moreover, Silberman argued, the
case relied upon by the majority, Peoples Gas, "is in tension with sub-
sequent governing legal developments"-namely the Supreme Court's
decision in Chevron-"that call[ ] for greater deference than used to be
given to agency interpretation of general or imprecise statutory
terms."201 While acknowledging that, "[w]e are, of course, entitled to
remand to an agency for an adequate explanation of its position so
that judicial review is possible," he warned that "[i]t is important that
we do so only on those occasions when we really do not perceive the
rationale for agency action-not when we are merely uncomfortable
with an agency's determination." 20
2
The NLRB did not act on the court's remand until almost five years
later, at which time it sent the case back to an ALJ for a further fac-
tual hearing prompted by the court's decision.2 03 Apparently, a new
bargaining order was never issued. Thus, the Board's ability to en-
force its chosen remedy for an employer's unfair labor practice was
frustrated. Unfortunately, such a result is not exceptional; in at least
two other cases, the D.C. Circuit has remanded affirmative bargaining
orders back to the NLRB for further explanation based on Chenery.
204
Faced with these remands, the Board in one case dug in its heels, "re-
affirm[ing] [its] longstanding policy of issuing an affirmative bargain-
198. Id. at 906 (Silberman, J., dissenting).
199. Id. (citation omitted)
200. Id. (citing cases relied upon by the panel majority in which the NLRB also issued
affirmative bargaining orders).
201. Id. at 909 (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837 (1984)).
202. Id. at 910. Judge Silberman added that: "It is often difficult for us to draw that
line in practice, and, in any given case, a judge's conclusion that an agency's ex-
planation is inadequate may depend a great deal on his or her view of the sub-
stantive law applied by the agency." Id.
203. Sullivan Indus., Inc., 322 N.L.R.B. 925, 925 (1997).
204. See Charlotte Amphitheater Corp. v. NLRB, 82 F.3d 1074, 1080 (D.C. Cir. 1996)
("[T]he Board's justification falls short of its obligation to clearly articulate why a
bargaining order is needed.... ."); Exxel/Atmos, Inc. v. NLRB, 28 F.3d 1243, 1248
(D.C. Cir. 1994) ("1W]e remand the remedial aspect of the case for the Board to
explain its imposition of the bargaining order.").
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ing order as the standard appropriate remedy for the restoration of
the status quo after an employer's unlawful withdrawal of recognition
from an incumbent union and subsequent refusal to bargain" and stat-
ing that "we have considered and balanced the critical statutory poli-
cies and rights relevant to the affirmative bargaining remedy and find
no need to engage in a case-by-case factual analysis to justify its fu-
ture imposition."205 In the other case, the Board chose not to reissue
its order, settling instead for less controversial-and presumably less
effective-remedies. 2 06
V. EVALUATING THE D.C. CIRCUIT'S APPLICATION OF THE
CHENERY DOCTRINE TO NLRB ORDERS
The D.C. Circuit's aggressive practice of remanding NLRB deci-
sions on the basis of Chenery is contrary to Supreme Court jurispru-
dence, and leads to precisely the waste of resources and unnecessary
delay that the Court has warned against in its decisions. Although
defenders of the D.C. Circuit's approach maintain that remands are
more protective of agency authority than reversals, it is not at all clear
that this is the case. In practice, the court has used Chenery remands
to prod and cajole the Board into agreeing to the court's substantive
policy preferences-"giv[ing] rise to cynical suspicion that Chenery
has become a tool permitting a reviewing court to do whatever it
pleases."20 7 To avoid such judicial interference with agency decision-
making, the D.C. Circuit should apply a harmless-error test before re-
manding any agency decision based on Chenery, an approach that has
already been adopted by a number of other circuits and accords with
Supreme Court jurisprudence.
The clearest examples of the D.C. Circuit's misuse of the Chenery
doctrine as a means of expressing its policy disagreement with the
Board are the bargaining order cases, like Sullivan Industries, Inc. v.
205. Exxel-Atmos, Inc., 323 N.L.R.B. 888, 888 (1997). In the ExxellAtmos litigation,
the NLRB not only reissued its bargaining order on remand, but also issued a
new bargaining order. Id. at 888 (affirming bargaining order on remand); Exxel-
Atmos, Inc., 323 N.L.R.B. 884 (1997) (issuing second bargaining order). The D.C.
Circuit eventually enforced this second bargaining order, but only because the
employer "never contested the propriety of the bargaining order in the proceed-
ings before the Board," therefore "waiv[ing] any right it had to object to the order
before [the] court." Exxel/Atmos, Inc. v. NLRB, 147 F.3d 972, 978 (D.C. Cir.
1998).
206. See Charlotte Amphitheater Corp., 331 N.L.R.B. 1274, 1274-76 (2000) (aban-
doning affirmative bargaining order as "likely... unenforceable" after D.C. Cir-
cuit's remand for inadequate explanation of reasoning and substituting
alternative remedies such as requiring employer to provide employee names and
addresses to union and allowing union representatives access to workplace bulle-
tin boards).
207. Friendly, supra note 17, at 212.
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NLRB,208 in which the court's remands for inadequate explanation of
reasoning frustrate the Board's ability to rely on its chosen remedy.
Simply put, although the D.C. Circuit states that its only purpose in
remanding is "for a clear statement of [the Board's policy] choices and
the reasons for them,"20 9 it is not at all clear that there is any ratio-
nale that the NLRB could provide that would satisfy the court-even
though the court acknowledges that "[ilt is up to the Board, not the
courts, to make labor policy" in this area. 2 10 Such use of Chenery re-
mands to do battle with the NLRB's policy decisions utterly disregards
Justice Frankfurter's warning that, "[b]ecause the relation of remedy
to policy is peculiarly a matter for administrative competence, courts
must not enter the allowable area of the Board's discretion and must
guard against the danger of sliding unconsciously from the narrow
confines of law into the more spacious domain of policy." 2 11 Such an
"open-ended manner [ofl apply[ing] the requirement of reasoned deci-
sionmaking" represents a judicial end-run around Supreme Court
precedents requiring deference to agency policymaking and permits a
reviewing court to mask its substantive disagreement with an
agency's permissible construction of its governing statute with proce-
dural objections that frustrate the ability of the agency to pursue its
chosen policy course. 2 12
Although the bargaining order cases are the most high-profile ex-
ample of the D.C. Circuit's interference with NLRB prerogatives, more
routine remands risk interference with Board policymaking as well.
Such remands create the risk that the NLRB will acquiesce in the
court's preferred policy position, not because of reflection and reliance
on agency expertise, but to preserve the Board's ability to have its or-
ders enforced by the court generally and avoid "'a nigh endless game
of battledore and shuttlecock.'" 2 13 In the remand that resulted from
the D.C. Circuit's decision in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. NLRB,214
for example, the NLRB made an exception from its general policy
"against deferral of representation issues which can only be resolved
through application of statutory policy" and complied with the court's
preferred result of allowing the case to go to arbitration, not on the
208. 957 F.2d 890 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
209. Exxel-Atmos, Inc. v. NLRB, 28 F.3d 1243, 1249 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
210. Id.
211. Phelps-Dodge v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 176, 194 (1941).
212. Richard J. Pierce,, Jr. The Role of the Judiciary in Implementing An Agency The-
ory of Government, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1239, 1265 (1989). Pierce suggests, for ex-
ample, that "[ilt is . . . highly probable that judges who used inadequate
procedures as a pretext for rejecting policy decisions inconsistent with their pol-
icy preferences before Vermont Yankee, [now] use inadequate reasoning to serve
the same purpose." Id.
213. Friendly, supra note 17, at 205 (quoting Erie-Lackawanna R.R. Co. v. United
States, 279 F. Supp. 316, 354-55 (S.D.N.Y. 1967)).
214. 59 F.3d 230 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
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basis of the Board's own reasoned consideration, but because of "the
fact of the court's remand."2 15 Such a result runs diametrically
counter to the holdings of the original SEC v. Chenery cases: to ensure
that an agency relies upon "its special administrative competence" in
reaching its decisions while guarding against the reviewing court
"entering] the province that belongs to the Board."2 16
The D.C. Circuit's repeated remands of NLRB orders also have a
cumulative effect on the efficiency of the Board's administrative
processes and the agency's ability to effectively enforce the nation's
labor laws. Wasteful remands exacerbate the NLRB's pre-existing
problems with timely adjudication,217 a problem that the D.C. Circuit
and other courts have elsewhere criticized, 2 1s and risk "convert[ing]
judicial review of agency action into a "ping-pong game" and a "formal-
ity."
2 1 9 The D.C. Circuit's demands for a more thorough explanation
of even the most routine NLRB orders also undermines recent Board
efforts to streamline its decision-making processes in order to dispose
of non-controversial cases more quickly. 22o In MacMillan Publishing
Co. v. NLRB,221 for example, the D.C. Circuit's Chenery remand led
the Board to reassign the case for a new hearing before an ALJ so that
all of the objections to the election could be considered, rather than
just the one objection relating to the employer's anti-union leaflet that
the NLRB had previously held dispositive. When the case reached the
court again, however, the D.C. Circuit found that the leaflet objection
alone was sufficient to resolve the case, even commenting that the em-
215. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 324 N.L.R.B. 1202, 1205 (1997).
216. SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery 1), 318 U.S. 80, 92, 94 (1943) (quoting Phelps
Dodge, 313 U.S. at 197).
217. John C. Truesdale, Battling Case Backlogs at the NLRB: The Continuing
Problems of Delays in Decision Making and the Clinton Board's Response, 16 LAB.
LAW. 1, 1, 3 (2000) ("Delays and accompanying large case backlogs have been a
recurring problem throughout the history of the Board."); Estreicher & Bodie,
supra note 26 (discussing causes of delays and proposing possible solutions); ED-
WARD B. MILLER, AN ADMINISTRATIVE APPRAISAL OF THE NLRB (Herbert R. Nor-
thrup ed., 4th ed. 1999) (1977) (Labor Relation & Pub. Policy Series No.16, 1999)
(providing suggestions for improving NLRB efficiency)).
218. Southwest Merchandising Corp. v. NLRB, 943 F.2d 1354, 1358 (D.C. Cir. 1991)
(characterizing NLRB's four-and-a-half year delay in deciding case as
"deplorable"); WILLIAM B. GOULD IV, LABORED RELATIONS: LAW, POLITICS, AND
THE NLRB-A MEMOIR 290-91 (listing cases in which courts of appeal have criti-
cized NLRB and refused to enforce Board orders because of lengthy delays in
issuing decisions).
219. NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 766 n.6 (1969).
220. See Truesdale, supra note 217, at 13-14 (discussing procedures "used primarily
to expedite ... relatively simple or non-controversial cases"); GOULD, supra note
218, at 61-62 (discussing attempts to implement various streamlining reforms,
including strict deadlines for the issuance of Board decisions in non-controversial
cases).
221. 194 F.3d 165 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
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ployer's action "constitut[ed] classic coercive conduct."22 2 The cost of
whatever marginal improvement in NLRB administrative process re-
sulted from this remand was high-a four and a half year delay in the
enforcement of the Board's original order, during which time the em-
ployees who had voted for a union were denied representation.
Surely, this was a case in which a remand was unnecessary, since
there was no significant chance that the NLRB would reach a differ-
ent result.
The D.C. Circuit's strict insistence that the NLRB distinguish prior
precedent is another burdensome aspect of the court's demand for
more thorough agency explanation, especially for an agency which has
accumulated seventy years of "numbingly detailed ALJ decisions" and
"fact-laden Board decision [s]"223 in interpreting "one of the aging New
Deal-era laws."22 4 As D.C. Circuit Judge Bazelon once noted: "The
Board cannot be expected, on pain of reversal, to anticipate and distin-
guish every marginally relevant case that a litigant might uncover in
preparing a petition for review."225 The Supreme Court made clear in
Chevron that the requirement to distinguish precedent cannot be ap-
plied so strictly so as to prevent an agency from reconsidering "the
wisdom of its policy on a continuing basis,"226 including occasionally
overruling its own precedent. Unfortunately, the D.C. Circuit's ag-
gressive use of Chenery to remand NLRB orders for failure to ade-
quately distinguish precedent has had precisely this inhibiting effect.
The example of Randell Warehouse v. NLRB,227 in which the D.C. Cir-
cuit's refusal to enforce the Board's overruling of its own precedent
because of the agency's supposed failure to adequately distinguish a
single case, is representative. It is easy to imagine the puzzlement the
NLRB must have felt when it received the court's decision accusing it
of a "silent departure from precedent,"228 since the Board majority
had-after soliciting amicus curiae briefs and holding oral argu-
222. Pearson Educ., Inc. v. NLRB, 373 F.3d 127, 131 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
223. Flynn, supra note 4, at 416, 416 n.120 (discussing the difficulty ofjudicial review
of NLRB decision making).
224. Brudney, Famous Victory, supra note 8, at 942.
225. Teamsters Local Union, 769 v. NLRB, 532 F.2d 1385, 1392 (D.C. Cir. 1976)
(Bazelon, C.J.). Cf Thomas 0. McGarity, Some Thoughts on "Deossifying" the
Rulemaking Process, 41 DuKE L.J. 1385, 1400 (1992) (noting, in the context of
formal rulemaking, that "[a]lthough not especially burdensome in theory, [rea-
soned explanation] requirements invite abuse by [regulated parties] who hire
consultants and lawyers to ... launch blunderbuss attacks on every detail of the
legal and technical bases for the agencies' rules" and that "agencies cannot afford
to allow any of the multifaceted attacks to go unanswered for fear that courts will
remand to them to respond to particular comments").
226. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 864 (1984).
227. 252 F.3d 445 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
228. Id. at 448 (quoting Cleveland Constr., Inc. v. NLRB, 44 F.3d 1010, 1016 (D.C. Cir.
1995)).
20081
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
ment-explicitly overturned one precedent and declined to overturn
another. This sense of bewilderment-or perhaps of frustration-
likely explains why the Board waited so long to issue a new decision in
the case, for "it seem[ed] difficult to imagine how more words or differ-
ent words could further illuminate its purpose or its
determination. "229
Supporters of the D.C. Circuit's approach to Chenery argue that
remands are more protective of agency authority than reversals.
Judge Wald, for example, once suggested that:
Remand on the basis of "inadequate agency rationale" provides a kind of nice
comity among different branches of government. It says "No" to the agency,
yet gives it a second chance with the court's guidance to reach the result it
thinks proper. And it should help to silence the more raucous charges that the
courts are usurping agency policymaking prerogatives. There is no question
that this technique engenders some delay, but in pioneering and popularizing
a more subdued approach to judicial oversight of agency policymaking, the
D.C. Circuit has tried to contain the ever-present tension between agency in-
dependence and judicial review of agency compliance with legislative
intent.
2 3 0
Similarly, Professor Ronald Levin suggests that an appealing feature
of the D.C. Circuit's approach is that it gives judges "the option of be-
ing able to have it both ways: remanding without vacation enables
them to enforce high standards of rigorous analysis without causing
serious disruption to an agency's program."
2 3 1
The difficulty with these "lesser evil" arguments is that, as Judge
(now Justice) Stephen Breyer explained, such an approach has a "far
greater substantive impact.., than one might at first realize":232
A remand.., for more thorough consideration may well mean several years of
additional proceedings, with mounting costs, and the threat of further judicial
review leading to abandonment or modification of the initial project irrespec-
tive of the merits. Courts and agencies alike are aware that these "more thor-
ough consideration" and "hard look" doctrines have substantive impact. To
that extent, in examining the attitude with which the courts apply the doc-
trines, one is, in an important sense, examining the attitude with which they
review the wisdom or reasonableness of agency substantive
decisionmaking.
2 3 3
229. SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery 1), 318 U.S. 80, 99 (1943) (Black, J. dissenting).
230. Wald et al., supra note 3, at 529. In more recent years, Judge Wald has acknowl-
edged the imperfections of her preferred approach, stating: "[R]eviewing courts-
it must be conceded-do not always fastidiously honor the limited purpose [of a
remand for inadequate explanation] or disguise their own preferred analyses.
We should and could do better on that score." Patricia M. Wald, The 1993 Justice
Lester W. Roth Lecture, Regulation at Risk: Are Courts Part of the Solution or
Most of the Problem?, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 621, 640 (1993).
231. Levin, supra note 3, at 302.
232. Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L.
REV. 363, 383 (1986).
233. Id.
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The availability of remands, Professor Daniel Rodriguez argues, "pro-
motes judicial activism . . . by empowering the courts to intervene
rather than hold back, in the agency decisionmaking process."
2 3 4
"While it is fair to suggest that agencies may prefer remand without
vacatur to the apocalyptic step of simple vacatur," Rodriguez explains,
"the choice between the two is truly an illusive one."2 35 In his analy-
sis, Professor (now Dean) Richard Revesz goes one step further, sug-
gesting that "[iideological voting is more pronounced with respect to
procedural challenges than statutory challenges" since "the Supreme
Court very seldom grants certiorari to review decisions of the D.C. Cir-
cuit on these questions."23 6 Such "unreviewed discretion"2 37 has
proved tempting to the D.C. Circuit as a means for the court to signal
its disagreement with NLRB policies; in Judge Friendly's colorful
phrasing: "If the court doesn't really like an agency decision, it can
find something wrong, and it will then pull Chenery out of the hat and
remand; if it likes the decision, minor peccadilloes will be forgotten
and Chenery also will be."
238
VI. CONCLUSION
As Justice Frankfurter made plain in the original Chenery deci-
sion, an administrative agency is not required to "exercise [its] admin-
istrative discretion in any particular manner or with artistic
refinement" and a reviewing court should avoid "sticking in the bark
of words."2 39 Rather than engage in "a nigh endless game of battle-
dore and shuttlecock,"2 40 the D.C. Circuit should engage in more
"pragmatic justice,"241 applying a harmless-error test before invoking
Chenery-remanding only when "there is a significant chance that but
for the error the agency might have reached a different result"24 2 or
where "the agency's path [cannot] reasonabl[y] be discerned" from its
decision.2 43
234. Rodriguez, supra note 3, at 601.
235. Id.
236. Revesz, supra note 5, at 1729-30.
237. Id. at 1730.
238. Friendly, supra note 85, at 4.
239. SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery 1), 318 U.S. 80, 95 (1943).
240. Erie-Lackawanna R.R. Co. v. United States, 279 F.Supp. 316, 355-56 (S.D.N.Y.
1967) (Friendly, J.), affd as modified, Penn-Central Merger and N & W Inclusion
Cases, 389 U.S. 486 (1968).
241. Harold Leventhal, Cues and Compasses for Administrative Lawyers, 20 ADMIN. L.
REV. 237, 239 (1967); Samuel Estreicher, Pragmatic Justice: The Contributions of
Judge Harold Leventhal to Administrative Law, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 894, 896
(1980).
242. Friendly, supra note 17, at 211.
243. Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc. 419 U.S. 281, 286
(1974).
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The D.C. Circuit's aggressive use of the Chenery doctrine to re-
mand NLRB orders not only runs counter to Supreme Court jurispru-
dence, but comes at great cost to the Board's administrative processes
and all who depend on it. Lost in the war of words between the court
and the Board are the litigants who await justice, for "the prolonged
process of reversal and remand for failure to state reasons adequately
and correctly [is] peculiarly painful to individuals needing quick relief
and lacking the funds for protracted proceedings."
2 44
The D.C. Circuit is "in a real sense part of the total administrative
process, and not a hostile stranger to the office of first instance."24 5
Instead of competing with the Board to provide the best interpretation
of the meaning of ambiguous sections of the NLRA, the D.C. Circuit
should recognize that "agencies and courts together constitute a 'part-
nership' in furtherance of the public interest," each with their proper
role. 246 By utilizing the Chenery doctrine with restraint and treating
the Board's decisions with the deference that, according to Supreme
Court precedent, they deserve, the D.C. Circuit and the NLRB should
be able to work together to improve the administrative process while
preserving the agency's congressionally delegated authority.
244. Friendly, supra note 17, at 216.
245. Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841 852 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (quot-
ing United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 422 (1941) (Stone, J.)).
246. Id. at 851 (citing Niagra Mohawk Power Corp. v. Fed. Power Comm's, 379 F.2d
153, 160 n.24 (D.C. Cir. 1967)).
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